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JURISDICTION 
Petitioner seeks review of an Order of the Industrial Commission which granted 
Kennecott Corporation's ("Kennecott") Motion for Review and, in so doing, denied 
petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing. (A copy of the Order Granting Motion for 
Review and the Order of Clarification are attached hereto in petitioner's Addendum as 
Exhibit "A" and Exhibit "B" respectively). U.C.A. §34-35-7.1(12) provides that an Order 
of the Industrial Commission concerning a written request for review is subject to judicial 
review as provided in U.C.A. §63-46b-16. U.C.A. §63-46b-16 provides: 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of 
Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final agency action 
resulting from formal adjudicated proceedings. 
As such, this court has jurisdiction to review the Order of Clarification and Order Granting 
Motion for Review issued by the Industrial Commission of Utah. 
ISSUE FOR REVIEW 
Did the Industrial Commission of Utah err in overturning the Administrative Law 
Judge's Order granting petitioner a formal hearing? 
Standard of Review: Pursuant to §63-46b-16(4)(d), this court shall grant relief if 
petitioner has been "substantially prejudiced" because the Industrial Commission has 
"erroneously interpreted or applied the law." Because this matter presents a question of 
statutory construction and legislative intent, this court may review for correctness and need 
not defer to the agency's interpretation. Crosland v. Board of Review. 828 P.2d 528, 529-
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30 (Utah App. 1992). This court must grant relief if it finds that the Industrial Commission 
erroneously interpreted the law to petitioner's substantial prejudice. Id. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Petitioner has attached copies of all provisions, statutes and rules in the Addendum 
rather than quoting verbatim each authority cited in the text of this brief. (See Addendum, 
Exhibit "C"). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Petitioner, Stephen E. Hausknect, filed a charge of age discrimination in 
employment with the UADD on or about May 12, 1992. 
2. The UADD entered a no cause determination on November 20, 1992. (A 
copy attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit "D"). 
3. The no cause determination was only based on information submitted to the 
UADD by counsel for both parties. 
4. Apparently, the investigator did not interview any witnesses or engage in any 
fact-finding investigation, prior to issuing his no-cause determination. 
5. On December 18, 1992, petitioner, through his counsel, filed a Notice of 
Evidentiary Hearing pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34-35-7. l(5)(c) and Rule 560-1-4 of the 
Utah Administration Code, requesting an evidentiary hearing on the determination rendered 
by the UADD. (A copy attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit ,fEff). 
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6. On March 15, 1993, Timothy C. Allen, Presiding Administrative Law Judge, 
issued an Order Granting Formal Proceeding. (A copy attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit 
"F"). 
7. On or about January 4, 1993, Kennecott filed a Response to Complainant's 
Request for an Evidentiary Hearing,which unexplicably was not in the file at the time of 
Judge Allen's consideration of Hausknecht's hearing request. As a result, Judge Allen set 
aside the March 15, 1993 Order for further consideration. (A copy of Response attached 
hereto as Addendum Exhibit"G"; a copy of Order Setting Aside Grant of Formal Proceeding 
attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit "H"). 
8. After due consideration, on April 26, 1993, Timothy C. Allen, presiding 
Administrative Law Judge for the Industrial Commission of Utah issued an Order Granting 
Formal Hearing Upon Further Review wherein Judge Allen determined that petitioner had 
met the requirements of law necessary to show entitlement to a hearing. (A copy attached 
hereto as Addendum Exhibit "I"). 
9. On May 12, 1993, Kennecott filed a Motion for Review of Judge Allen's 
Order granting petitioner a formal hearing. (A copy attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit 
"J"). 
10. On October 26, 1993, the Industrial Commission of Utah issued an Order 
granting Motion for Review which "ordered that the Motion for Review of the Order of the 
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Administrative Law Judge dated April 26, 1993 is hereby denied." (A copy attached hereto 
as Addendum Exhibit "A"). 
11. On November 5, 1993, the Industrial Commission of Utah issued an Order 
of Clarification wherein it "ordered that [Kennecott's] Motion for Review requesting that the 
evidentiary hearing be denied is hereby granted and the decision of the Administrative Law 
Judge to grant the evidentiary hearing is hereby reversed." (A copy attached hereto as 
Addendum Exhibit "B"). 
12. Petitioner appeals the Industrial Commission of Utah's Order of Clarification 
which reversed the decision of Judge Allen granting petitioner an evidentiary hearing. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Industrial Commission's reversal of the Administrative Law Judge's granting of 
petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing violated petitioner's right to due process and 
the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COMMISSION'S REVERSAL OF THE ALPS GRANTING 
OF PETITIONER'S REQUEST FOR AN EVIDENTIARY 
HEARING VIOLATED PETITIONER'S 
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS. 
It is well recognized that "implicit in the due process clause of our State Constitution 
is that persons be afforded a hearing to determine their rights under the law." Gribble v. 
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Gribble. 583 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1978); Constitution of Utah, Article I, §7. The Commi-
ssion's summary dismissal of petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing deprived him 
of his only remedy under the state anti-discrimination laws without petitioner ever having had 
a hearing of any kind. Retherford v. AT&T. 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992). As such, the 
Commission's refusal to grant petitioner a hearing constitutes a denial of his right to due 
process. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
Due process is not a technical conception with a fixed content 
unrelated to time, place, and circumstances; it is flexible and 
requires such procedural protections as the particular situation 
demands. In an analysis of a procedure an important factor is 
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of a private interest 
through the procedures, and the probable value, if any, of 
additional or substitute procedural safeguards. 
Worrall v. Qgden Citv Fire Department. 616 P.2d 598, 602 (Utah 1980). Here, there has 
been an erroneous deprivation of petitioner's interest in a formal hearing by the Commi-
ssion's refusal to adequately consider petitioner's request for hearing. 
In Utah, courts have repeatedly reviewed administrative hearings and proceedings to 
determine whether both the procedures are satisfactory and the outcome is fair. For 
instance, in Child v. Salt Lake Citv Civil Service Commission. 575 P.2d 195 (Utah 1978), 
the Utah Supreme Court was asked to review the decision of the Salt Lake City Civil Service 
Commission upholding the discharge of the Chief of Police. The court noted that the review 
of the Commission's decision was warranted and authorized by the Utah Constitution, Article 
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VIII, Section 9. The court then stated that it had the power to grant relief from that decision 
if it found that the Commission had "exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion." The 
court went on to review the decision to determine if the findings and order of the 
Commission had been "arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable." Id. 
In Anderson v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 696 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1985), the Utah 
Supreme Court was asked to overturn the decision of the Industrial Commission on the 
grounds that the Administrative Law Judge had previously represented one of the parties in 
the hearing. In reaching its conclusion that the decision should be overturned, the court 
stated: 
One of the fundamental principles of due process is that all 
parties to a case are entitled to an unbiased, impartial judge. 
'A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due 
process.' (citation omitted) 
Id. at 1221. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Bunnell v. Industrial Commission of Utah. 740 P.2d 
1331 (Utah 1987) emphasized the requirement that every person is entitled to a fair hearing: 
. . . every person who brings a claim in a court or at a hearing 
held before an administrative agency, has a due process right 
to receive a fair trial in front of a fair tribunal. Anderson v. 
Industrial Commission. 696 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1985). 
Fairness requires not only an absence of actual bias, but 
endeavors to prevent even the possibility of unfairness. Id. at 
1221. . . . our review of the record persuades us that the 
manner in which the Administrative Law Judge conducted this 
hearing was sufficiently unfair as to constitute the denial of 
plaintiffs constitutional right to a fair hearing. 
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Bunnell, at 1333. Here, it was patently unfair to deny petitioner an opportunity to be heard 
in a de novo review hearing. 
The requirement that all hearings, including administrative hearings, comport with 
minimum standards of fairness was further developed in Tolman v. Salt Lake County 
Attorney. 818 P.2d 23 (Utah App. 1991). There, the plaintiff challenged the results of a 
grievance hearing held before the Salt Lake County Career Service Council on the grounds 
that hearsay evidence had been admitted. The court concluded that the admission of such 
evidence was unfair because it prevented Tolman from exercising his right to cross-examine 
witnesses and therefore violated his right to due process. The court emphasized: 
Every person who brings a claim in a court or at a hearing 
held before an administrative agency has a due process right to 
receive a fair trial in front of a fair tribunal. Bunnell, 740 
P.2d at 1333. As a general rule, 'due process demands a new 
trial when the appearance of unfairness is so plain, that we are 
left with the abiding impression that a reasonable person would 
find the hearing unfair.' Id. Note 1. 
Tolman. at 28. 
The Commission's reversal of the Administrative Law Judge's grant of an evidentiary 
hearing does not rise to the basic level of fairness enunciated and required by the Utah 
Supreme Court. Importantly, petitioner's remedy under state law for employment 
discrimination lies with the UADD pursuant to the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, U.C.A. 
§34-35-1, et seg. Nevertheless, the UADD performed only a cursory review of petitioner's 
claim. No fact finding was performed. No interviews were performed nor were 
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interrogatories or requests for documents sent to the parties. In short, the investigatory 
procedures were wholly inadequate to determine if the discriminatory conduct alleged by 
petitioner had occurred. By denying petitioner an evidentiary hearing, the Commissioner 
effectively eliminated any sort of inquiry into the truth of and factual bases for petitioner's 
allegations of discrimination. 
The Commission's refusal to allow petitioner any type of hearing to which he was 
entitled violates petitioner's fundamental due process right to receive a fair trial in front of 
a fair tribunal. Anderson v. Industrial Commission, 696 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1985). 
Therefore, petitioner respectfully submits that the Commission's Order was improper and 
substantially prejudices him by denying him due process of law. As such, the Administrative 
Law Judge's Order granting petitioner a hearing should be reinstated. 
n. 
THE COMMISSION'S REVERSAL OF THE ALPS GRANT 
OF AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING VIOLATES THE 
UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT. 
The Administrative Procedures Act, U.C.A. §63-46b-0.5 et seg. applies to and 
governs every agency of the State of Utah. The Anti-Discrimination Act, U.C.A. §34-35-1 
et seq. delineates the procedures utilized by the Industrial Commission and the UADD in 
adjudicating claims of discrimination. In particular, U.C.A. §34-35-7.1 enunciates the 
procedure for aggrieved persons to file a claim alleging discrimination. The Industrial 
Commission's rules further provide: 
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The adjudicative proceeding referred to in §34-35-7. l(6)-( 10), 
U.C.A., is a formal adjudicative hearing which shall occur 
following the investigative process referred to in §34-35-7.1(1)-
(5), U.C.A. 
Utah Administrative Code, R 560-1-5. The Utah Administrative Procedures Act, §63-46(b)-
8 sets forth the procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings. 
Despite the fact that the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act, and the Industrial Commission's own Administrative Rules recognize and 
require that a formal adjudicative hearing shall occur following the investigative process, the 
Commission overruled Judge Allen's granting of just such a hearing. The Commission's 
reversal of Judge Allen's Order was based on the Commission's conclusion that "an 
evidentiary hearing was not necessary under the circumstances of this case." (See Order of 
Clarification, Exhibit "B" hereto). The Industrial Commission's Administrative Rules are 
quite lenient in prescribing when an evidentiary hearing is necessary: 
A request for an evidentiary hearing must state a reason why 
the hearing is necessary. A hearing will not be considered 
necessary if the hearing will not add to the evidence in the 
investigatory file or cause the evidence in the investigatory file 
to be viewed differently. In most cases, the need to cross-
examine the individuals who have submitted affidavits support-
ive of the initial finding or determination of the Commission 
will be considered a valid reason for granting a request for a 
hearing by the Commission. 
Utah Administrative Code, R 560-1-4A4. Judge Allen had found that petitioner had met the 
requirements by showing that a hearing would add to the evidence in the investigatory file 
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or show that the evidence in the file may be viewed differently by the hearing. (See Order 
Granting Formal Hearing Upon Further Review, Exhibit "I" hereto). Based upon Judge 
Allen's determination, a formal adjudicative hearing should have proceeded. The reversal 
of that decision by the Commission violates the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, the 
Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, and the Industrial Commission's own Administrative Rules. 
in. 
PETITIONER MADE AN ADEQUATE SHOWING THAT A 
HEARING WOULD ADD TO THE EVIDENCE IN THE 
FILE AND/OR SHOW THAT THE EVIDENCE 
WOULD BE VIEWED DIFFERENTLY 
AFTER THE HEARING. 
Timothy C. Allen, presiding Administrative Law Judge, entered his Order granting 
petitioner's request for hearing after taking into account both petitioner's reasons supporting 
his request and Kennecott's responses in opposition to the request. Specifically, Judge Allen 
determined that petitioner had met the requirements of law and had shown "that a hearing 
will add to the evidence in the investigatory file, or show that the evidence in the file may 
be viewed differently by the hearing." In spite of this determination, the Commission 
reversed Judge Allen's Order and essentially accepted the UADD's determination verbatim 
without giving any credence to the reasons enunciated by plaintiff in his request for a 
hearing. Petitioner, therefore, files this appeal on the additional grounds that he sufficiently 
showed that a hearing was warranted and that the Commission, in reversing presiding 
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Administrative Law Judge Allen's Order, failed to consider the facts and argument presented 
by petitioner. 
Petitioner requested a hearing because the investigation that was conducted in this 
matter was extremely limited. Other than the initial statement submitted by the petitioner, 
no affidavits or sworn statements appear to have been provided to the investigator. Because 
of the extremely limited nature of the investigation, an evidentiary hearing on this case is 
warranted. Additionally, a hearing is needed for the following reasons: 
1. Collection of evidence. Other than certain cursory and conclusory statements 
submitted on behalf of the petitioner and the respondent, there has been no admissible 
evidence (other than petitioner's initial statement) submitted to the investigator. A hearing 
is necessary so that witnesses can be called, testimony taken and various documentary 
evidence presented to the Commission; 
2. Cross-examination of the witnesses. A hearing is necessary so that individuals 
who have knowledge and information relevant to petitioner's claims can be put on the stand 
and cross-examined by the petitioner. It is well established that cross-examination of 
witnesses is a minimum requirement of due process. State of Utah v. Stames. 841 P.2d 712 
(Utah App. 1992); 
3. Compel certain witnesses to testify. It is virtually impossible for petitioner, 
in support of his UADD claim, to contact Kennecott employees who may be able to provide 
testimony which substantiates petitioner's claims. Those individuals would understandably 
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be reluctant to voluntarily give statements to petitioner during the investigation inasmuch as 
they would fear that adverse employment actions might or will be taken against them. The 
investigator never sought testimony from Kennecott's employees. A hearing would provide 
petitioner the opportunity to subpoena Kennecott employees who may have testimony 
favorable to his position. 
As set forth above, the Commission's reversal of Judge Allen's Order granting a 
hearing is fundamentally unfair and denies petitioner his right to due process and precludes 
him from pursuing its statutory remedies. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, petitioner asserts that the Commission's Order 
reversing Judge Allen's Order is fundamentally unfair and denies him his due process right 
to receive a fair trial in front of a fair tribunal, and violates the provisions of the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act and the Utah Anti-Discriminatory Act which assure a formal 
adjudicative hearing in most instances. Moreover, the Commission's total reliance on the 
UADD's determination raises the question of whether petitioner's Request for Hearing and 
the facts and arguments set forth therein were ever even considered by the Commission 
before it reversed Judge Allen's grant of an evidentiary hearing. 
A de novo evidentiary hearing would add to the scant evidence in the case and would 
show that the evidence in the investigatory file would be viewed differently. Thus, petitioner 
respectfully requests that this court overturn the Commission's decision, and order that 
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petitioner be entitled to a formal evidentiary hearing, which comports with the requisites of 
the Utah Administrative Procedure Act, §63-46b-8, to review de novo the Determination and 
Order of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division. 
- isc: 
DATED this JJ_ day of April, 1994. 
Erik Strindberg 
Martha S. Stonebrook 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 146615 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-6615 
STEVEN E. HAUSKNECHT, * 
* 
Charging Party, * 
vs. * 
KENNECOTT CORPORATION * 
• 
Respondent. * 
********************************* 
The Industrial Commission of Utah ("Commission") reviews this 
Motion for Review pursuant to U.C.A. § 63-46b-16. The Respondent 
has requested review of the Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ") 
Order of April 26, 1993 granting the Charging Party's request for 
a formal hearing to review de novo the Determination and Order of 
the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division ("UADD"). 
The Respondent asserts that the Charging Party's request for 
a hearing does not comply with the requirements of Utah law for 
granting a formal hearing from a determination and order entered by 
the UADD. Respondent asserts that the ALJ's order fails to specify 
the basis upon which it is granted and that the record does not 
support the grant of a formal hearing. 
U.C.A. § 34-35-7.1(5)(c) provides that "[a] party may file a 
written request to the director for an evidentiary hearing to 
review de novo the director's determination and order within 30 
days of the date of the determination and order." The UADD rules 
provide that "[a] request for an evidentiary hearing must state a 
reason why the hearing is necessary. A hearing will not be 
considered necessary if the hearing will not add to the evidence in 
the investigatory file or cause the evidence in the investigatory 
file to,- be viewed differently.1" The rule notes that "[i]n most 
cases, the need to cross examine the individuals who have submitted 
affidavits supportive of the initial finding or determination of 
the Commission will be considered a valid reason for granting a 
request for a hearing by the Commission.2" 
The Charging Party's request for a hearing asserts that a 
hearing is necessary so that a complete investigation can be done. 
The Charging Party asserts that evidence reasonably available to 
the investigator would show that the Charging Party did establish 
a prima facie case of age discrimination, that there is a need to 
take testimony from witnesses such as the Charging Party and the 
1
 U.A.C. R560-l-4(4) (1993). 
2
 Id. 
E x h i b i t . ^ 
ORDER GRANTING 
MOTION FOR REVIEW 
UADD No. 92-0393 
EEOC No. 35C-92-0418 
STEVEN E. HAUSKNECHT 
ORDER 
PAGE TWO 
people involved in the decision to terminate him and notes that the 
investigator failed to interview witnesses or take affidavits. The 
Charging Party further claims that there was "evidence" presented 
in the charge that the Charging Party was terminated because his 
employer wanted to reduce staff in the facility where the Charging 
Party worked without having to pay severance benefits, an issue 
which was not addressed by the investigator. The Charging Party 
asserts that the Commission needs to take evidence regarding the 
Respondent's sexual harassment training policy and to investigate 
the allegations that the Charging Party sexually harassed his 
female co-workers. 
The Respondent asserts that the reasons proffered by the 
Charging Party are insufficient to warrant a grant of a formal 
hearing because the purpose of a formal hearing is not to conduct 
an investigation or collect evidence. 
In our review of the file, we find that the Charging Party 
failed to submit any evidence in support of his claim during the 
UADD's informal investigation. He did not complete and sign an 
affidavit upon filing his charge and submitted no documentation or 
evidence in support of his claim. Every document submitted by the 
Charging Party was argument not evidence. We believe that R560-1-4 
contemplates that the party seeking review has fully participated 
in the proceedings below. The evidence offered by the Charging 
Party appears to have been available during the UADD's investiga-
tion, but was not supplied at that time. Therefore, the Charging 
Party cannot assert that there is evidence which will support his 
claim which was not submitted during the investigation, although it 
was available at that time. 
It is an elementary concept in employment discrimination law 
that the burden of proof rests with the Charging Party.3 The 
3
 See Texas Dept. of Comm. Affairs v. Burdinef 67 L.Ed, ed 207 
(1981). Under Burdine, it is the plaintiff's burden to show that 
similarly situated employees were not treated equally and, 
ultimately, to show that the defendant intentionally discriminated 
against the plaintiff. Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie 
case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to 
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse 
employment action. 
STEVEN E. HAUSKNECHT 
ORDER 
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Charging Party did not submit the names of witnesses that he wanted 
the investigator to interview and, apparently, made no effort to 
submit affidavits or other evidence in support of his charge. 
We do not think that a party should be allowed to obtain an 
evidentiary hearing by claiming that the UADD has failed to 
properly investigate the subject charge when the party requesting 
the hearing has failed to participate fully in the proceedings 
below. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. The Charging Party failed to submit evidence in support of 
his charge of discrimination during the investigative proceeding. 
2. The evidence the Charging Party seeks to submit at this 
time was available at the time of the UADD investigation. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
Therefore, for the above reasons, we find that the Charging 
Party has failed to show that an evidentiary hearing is necessary 
pursuant to the requirements of R560-1-4. Therefore, we hereby 
deny his request for a formal evidentiary hearing. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion for Review of the 
Order of the Administrative Law Judge dated April 26, 1993 is 
hereby denied. 
If you intend to appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals you must 
do so within 30 days of the date of this Order. If you want a 
transcript of the hearing for your appeal you must bear all the 
cost of preparing it. 
You also have the right to ask the Industrial Commission to 
reconsider this Order, under U.C.A. § 63-46b-13, but you must 
request reconsideration within 20 days of the date of this Order. 
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DATED this ^fJ^ day of (D<^ZXc^J 1993 . 
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Stephen M. Hadleyl Chairman 
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On October 26, 1993 the Industrial Commission of Utah 
("Commission") issued an "Order Granting Motion for Review" 
("Order") in the above entitled case. It would appear that the 
Order is internally inconsistent in stating that the Motion for 
Review of the Order of the Administrative Law Judge is hereby 
denied. 
The Administrative Law Judge allowed a request for evidentiary 
hearing. Upon review of the file, the Commission concluded that an 
evidentiary hearing was not necessary under the circumstances of 
this case. We therefore issue this Order of Clarification sua 
sponte. 
The Order of the Commission dated October 26, 1993 should be 
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ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Respondents Motion for 
Review requesting that the evidentiary hearing be denied is hereby 
granted and the decision of the administrative law judge to grant 
the evidentiary hearing is hereby reversed. 
If you intend to appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals you must 
do so within 30 days of the date of this Order. If you want a 
transcript of the hearing for your appeal you must bear all the 
cost of preparing it. 
You also have the right to ask the Industrial Commission to 
reconsider this Order, under U.C.A. § 63-46b-13, but you must 
request reconsideration within 20 days of the date of this Order. 
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
PREAMBLE 
Article 
I. Declaration of Rights 
II. State Boundaries 
IE. Ordinance 
IV. Elections and Right of Suffrage 
V. Distribution of Powers 
VI. Legislative Department 
VII. Executive Department 
VIII. Judicial Department 
IX. Congressional and Legislative Apportion-
ment 
X. Education 
XI. Counties, Cities and Towns 
XII. Corporations 
XHI. Revenue and Taxation 
XIV. Public Debt 
XV. Militia 
XVI. Labor 
XVH. Water Rights 
XVm. Forestry 
XIX. Public Buildings and State Institutions 
XX. Public Lands 
XXI. Salaries 
XXII. Miscellaneous 
XXm. Amendment and Revision 
XXIV. Schedule 
PREAMBLE 
Grateful to Almighty God for life and liberty, we, 
the people of Utah, in order to secure and perpetuate 
the principles of free government, do ordain and es-
tablish this CONSTITUTION. 1896 
ARTICLE I 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
Section 
1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
2. [All political power inherent in the people.] 
3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.] 
4. [Religious liberty — No property qualification to 
vote or hold office.] 
5. [Habeas corpus.] 
6. [Right to bear arms.] 
7. [Due process of law.] 
8. [Offenses bailable.] 
9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.] 
10. [Trial by jury.] 
11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
13. [Prosecution by information or indictment — 
Grand jury.] 
14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of 
warrant . ] 
15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.] 
16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.] 
17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.] 
18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing 
contracts.] 
19. [Treason defined — Proof.] 
20. [VUitary subordinate to the civil power.] 
21 . [Slavery forbidden.] 
22. [Private property for public use.] 
23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
Section 
24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
25. [Rights retained by people.] 
26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.] 
27. [Fundamental rights.] 
Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
All men have the inherent and inalienable r ight to 
enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, 
possess and protect property; to worship according to 
the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peace-
ably, protest against wrongs, and petition for redress 
of grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts 
and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of tha t 
right. 1896 
Sec. 2. [All political power inherent in the peo-
ple.] 
All political power is inherent in the people; and all 
free governments are founded on their authori ty for 
their equal protection and benefit, and they have the 
r ight to al ter or reform their government as the pub-
lic welfare may require. 1896 
Sec. 3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.] 
The Sta te of Utah is an inseparable par t of the 
Federal Union and the Constitution of the United 
Sta tes is the supreme law of the land. 1896 
Sec . 4. [Religious l iberty — N o property qualifi-
cation to vote or hold office.] 
The r ights of conscience shall never be infringed. 
The State shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; no religious test shall be required as a quali-
fication for any office of public t rus t or for any vote a t 
any election; nor shall any person be incompetent as 
a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the 
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church 
and State , nor shall any church dominate the State or 
interfere with its functions. No public money or prop-
erty shall be appropriated for or applied to any reli-
gious worship, exercise or instruction, or for the sup-
port of any ecclesiastical establishment. No property 
qualification shall be required of any person to vote, 
or hold office, except as provided in this Constitution. 
1896 
Sec. 5. [Habeas corpus.] 
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not 
be suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, 
the public safety requires it. 1896 
Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.] 
The individual r ight of the people to keep and bear 
arms for security and defense of self, family, others, 
property, or the state, as well as for other lawful pur-
poses shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall 
prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use 
of arms. 1984 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or prop-
erty, without due process of law. 1896 
Sec. 8. [Offenses bailable.] 
(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bail-
able except: 
(a) persons charged with a capital offense 
when there is substantial evidence to support the 
charge; or 
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34-34-11. Injunctive relief — Damages. 
Any employer, person, firm, association, corpora-
tion, employee, labor union, labor organization or any 
other type of association injured as a result of any 
violation or threatened violation of any provision of 
this chapter, or threatened with any such violation 
shall be entitled to injunctive relief against any and 
all violators of [or] persons threatening violation and 
also to recover from such violator or violators, or per-
son or persons, any and all damages of any character 
cognizable at common law resulting from such viola-
tions or threatened violations. Such remedies shall be 
independent of and in addition to the penalties and 
remedies prescribed in other provisions of this chap-
ter. 1969 
34-34-12. Injunction against violating chapter. 
In addition to the penal provisions of this chapter, 
any person, firm, corporation, association, or any 
labor union, labor organization or any other type of 
association, or any officer, representative, agent or 
member thereof may be restrained by injunction from 
doing or continuing to do any of the matters and 
things prohibited by this chapter. 1969 
34-34-13. Damages for denial or deprivation of 
continuation of employment 
Any person who may be denied employment or be 
deprived of continuation of his employment in viola-
tion of this chapter shall be entitled to recover from 
such employer and from any other person, firm, cor-
poration or association acting in concert with him by 
appropriate action in the courts of this state such 
damages as he may have sustained by reason of such 
denial or deprivation of employment. 1969 
34-34-14. Jurisdiction. 
The jurisdiction of any action brought to enforce 
this chapter is hereby conferred upon and vested in 
the district court of the county in which any person, 
group of persons, firm, association, corporation, labor 
union, labor organization or any other type of associa-
tion, or representatives thereof, who violates this 
chapter, or any part of it, resides or has a place of 
business, or may be found and served with process. 
1969 
34-34-15. Existing contracts — Chapter applica-
ble upon renewal or extension. 
The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to 
any lawful contract in force on the effective date of 
this act, but they shall apply in all respects to con-
tracts entered into after such date and to any renewal 
or extension of any existing contract. 1969 
34-34-16. Right to bargain collectively no t de-
nied. 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to deny 
the r ight of employees to bargain collectively with 
their employer by and through labor unions, labor 
organizations or any other type of associations. 1969 
34-34-17. Violation of act a misdemeanor . 
A violation of this act shall constitute a misde-
meanor, and each day such unlawful conduct, as de-
fined in this chapter, is in effect or continued shall be 
deemed a separate offense and shall be punishable as 
such, as provided in this chapter. 1969 
CHAPTER 35 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION ACT 
Section 
34-35-1. Short title. 
Section 
34-35-2. Definitions. 
34-35-3. Jurisdiction of Industrial Commission 
— Creation of antidiscrimination 
division — Co-ordinator of fair em-
ployment practices. 
34-35-4. Antidiscrimination division — Mem-
bers — Meetings — Quorum. 
34-35-5. Antidiscrimination division — 
Powers. 
34-35-6. Discriminatory or unfair employment 
practices — Permitted practices. 
34-35-7. Repealed. 
34-35-7.1. Procedure for aggrieved person to file 
claim — Investigations — Adjudica-
tive proceedings — Sett lement — 
Reconsideration — Determination. 
34-35-8. Repealed. 
34-35-1. Short title. 
This shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah 
Anti-Discriminatory Act." 1969 
34-35-2. Def ini t ions . 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Apprenticeship" means any program for 
the t raining of apprentices including, but not 
limited to, any program providing the t ra in ing of 
those persons defined as apprentices by Section 
35-8-5, whether or not such program is registered 
and approved by the Apprenticeship Council un-
der Section 35-8-2. 
(2) "Bona fide occupational qualification" 
means a characteristic applying to an employee 
which is necessary to the operation or is the es-
sence of his employer's business. 
(3) "Commission" means the Industrial Com-
mission of the s tate of Utah, and "commissioner" 
means a member of tha t commission. 
(4) "Coordinator" or "director" means the indi-
vidual who manages the enforcement of this 
chapter. 
(5) "Court" means the district court in the ju-
dicial district of the state of Utah in which the 
asserted unfair employment practice occurred, or 
if this court is not in session a t tha t t ime, then 
any judge of the court. 
(6) "Employee" means any person applying 
with or employed by an employer. 
(7) "Employer" means the state or any politi-
cal subdivision or board, commission, depart-
ment, institution, school district, t rust , or agent 
thereof, and every other person employing 15 or 
more employees within the state for each work-
ing day in each of 20 calendar weeks or more in 
the current or preceding calendar year; bu t it 
does not include religious organizations or associ-
ations, religious corporations sole, nor any corpo-
ration or association constituting a wholly owned 
subsidiary or agency of any religious organiza-
tion or association or religious corporation sole. 
(8) "Employment agency" means any person 
under taking to procure employees or opportuni-
ties to work for any other person, or the holding 
itself out to be equipped to do so. 
(9) "Handicap" means a physical or mental im-
pairment which substantially limits one or more 
of a person's major life activities. 
(10) "Joint apprenticeship committee" means 
any association of representatives of a labor orga-
nization and an employer providing, coordinat-
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ing, or controlling an apprentice training pro-
gram. 
(11) "Labor organization" means any organi-
zation which exists for the purpose in whole or in 
part of collective bargaining or of dealing with 
employers concerning grievances, terms or condi-
tions of employment, or of other mutual aid or 
protection in connection with employment. 
(12) "National origin" means the place of 
birth, domicile, or residence of an individual or of 
an individual's ancestors. 
(13) "On-the-job-training" means any program 
designed to instruct a person who, while learning 
the particular job for which he is receiving in-
struction, is also employed at that job, or who 
may be employed by the employer conducting the 
program during the course of the program, or 
when the program is completed. 
(14) "Person" means one or more individuals, 
partnerships, associations, corporations, legal 
representatives, trusts or trustees, receivers, the 
state of Utah and all political subdivisions and 
agencies of the state. 
(15) "Presiding officer" means the same as 
that term is defined in Section 63-46b-2. 
(16) "Prohibited employment practice" means 
a practice specified as discriminatory, and there-
fore unlawful, in Section 34-35-6. 
(17) "Retaliate" means the taking of adverse 
action by an employer, employment agency, 
labor organization, apprenticeship program, on-
the-job training program, or vocational school 
against one of its employees, applicants, or mem-
bers because he has opposed any employment 
practice prohibited under this chapter of because 
he has filed charges, testified, assisted, or partici-
pated in any way in any proceeding, investiga-
tion, or hearing under this chapter. 
(18) "Vocational school" means any school or 
institution conducting a course of instruction, 
training, or retraining to prepare individuals to 
follow an occupation or trade, or to pursue a man-
ual, technical, industrial, business, commercial, 
office, personal services, or other nonprofessional 
occupations. 1990 
4-35-3. Jurisdiction of Industrial Commission 
— Creation of antidiscrimination divi-
sion — Co-ordinator of fair employ-
ment practices. 
The commission shall have jurisdiction over the 
ubject of employment practices and discrimination 
lade unlawful by this chapter. There is hereby cre-
ted a division of the commission to be known and 
esignated as the Utah Antidiscrimination Division, 
rhich division shall be under the jurisdiction and di-
ection of the commission. The division shall have as 
ts immediate supervisory head a co-ordinator of fair 
mployment practices. Such co-ordinator shall be ap-
ointed by the commission. Any co-ordinator so ap-
pointed shall at all times be under the direct supervi-
ion and control of the commission. 1969 
4-35-4. Antidiscrimination division — Mem-
bers — Meetings — Quorum. 
The antidiscrimination division shall consist of 
hree members who shall be members of the commis-
ion. The commission may adopt, amend or rescind 
ules for governing its meetings, and two commis-
ioners shall constitute a quorum. 1969 
t4-35-5. Antidiscrimination division — Powers. 
(1) The Utah Antidiscrimination Division may: 
(a) appoint and prescribe the duties of investi-
gators and other employees and agents that it 
considers necessary for the enforcement of this 
chapter; 
(b) adopt, publish, amend, and rescind rules, 
consistent with, and for the enforcement of, this 
chapter, 
(c) receive, reject, investigate, and pass upon 
complaints alleging discrimination in employ-
ment, apprenticeship programs, on-the-job train-
ing programs, and vocational schools, or the exis-
tence of a discriminatory or prohibited employ-
ment practice by a person, an employer, an em-
ployment agency, a labor organization, or the 
employees or members of an employment agency 
or labor organization, a joint apprenticeship com-
mittee, and vocational school; 
(d) investigate and study the existence, char-
acter, causes, and extent of discrimination in em-
ployment, apprenticeship programs, on-the-job 
training programs, and vocational schools in this 
state by employers, employment agencies, labor 
organizations, joint apprenticeship committees, 
and vocational schools; 
(e) formulate plans for the elimination of dis-
crimination by educational or other means; 
(f) hold hearings upon complaint made against 
a person, an employer, an employment agency, a 
labor organization or the employees or members 
of an employment agency or labor organization, a 
joint apprenticeship committee, or a vocational 
school; 
(g) issue publications and reports of investiga-
tions and research that will tend to promote good 
will among the various racial, religious, and eth-
nic groups of the state, and that will minimize or 
eliminate discrimination in employment because 
of race, color, sex, religion, national origin, age, 
or handicap; 
(h) prepare and transmit to the governor, at 
least once each year, reports describing its pro-
ceedings, investigations, hearings it has con-
ducted and the outcome of those hearings, deci-
sions it has rendered, and the other work per-
formed by it; 
(i) recommend policies to the governor, and 
submit recommendation to employers, employ-
ment agencies, and labor organizations to imple-
ment those policies; 
(j) recommend any legislation concerning dis-
crimination because of race, sex, color, national 
origin, religion, age, or handicap to the governor 
that it considers necessary; 
(k) within the limits of any appropriations 
made for its operation, cooperate with other 
agencies or organizations, both public and pri-
vate, in the planning and conducting of educa-
tional programs designed to eliminate discrimi-
natory practices prohibited under this chapter; 
and 
(1) adopt an official seal. 
(2) The division shall investigate alleged discrimi-
natory practices involving officers or employees of 
state government if requested to do so by the Career 
Service Review Board. 
(3) (a) In any hearing held under the authority of 
this chapter, the division may: 
(i) subpoena witnesses and compel their 
attendance at the hearing; 
(ii) administer oaths and take the testi-
mony of any person under oath; and 
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(iii) compel any person to produce for ex-
amination any books, papers, or other infor-
mation relating to the matters raised by the 
complaint. 
(b) Any of the following may conduct hearings: 
(i) the commission; 
(ii) any commissioner; 
(iii) the coordinator; or 
(iv) a hearing examiner or agent ap-
pointed by the commission. 
(c) If a witness fails or refuses to obey a sub-
poena issued by the commission, the commission 
may petition the district court to enforce the sub-
poena. 
(d) (i) No person may be excused from attend-
ing or testifying, or from producing records, 
correspondence, documents, or other evi-
dence in obedience to a subpoena issued by 
the commission under the authority of this 
section on the ground that the evidence or 
the testimony required may tend to incrimi-
nate him or subject him to any penalty or 
forfeiture. 
(ii) No person may be prosecuted or sub-
jected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on 
account of any transaction, matter, or thing 
concerning which he shall be compelled to 
testify or produce evidence after having 
claimed his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, except that a person testifying is not 
exempt from prosecution and punishment for 
perjury. 1989 
34-35-6. Discriminatory or unfair employment 
practices — Permitted practices. 
(1) It is a discriminatory or prohibited employment 
practice: 
(a) (i) for an employer to refuse to hire, or pro-
mote, or to discharge, demote, terminate any 
person, or to retaliate against, harass, or dis-
criminate in matters of compensation or in 
terms, privileges, and conditions of employ-
ment against any person otherwise qualified, 
because of race, color, sex, pregnancy, child-
birth, or pregnancy-related conditions, age, 
if the individual is 40 years of age or older, 
religion, national origin, or handicap. No ap-
plicant nor candidate for any job or position 
may be considered "otherwise qualified," un-
less he possesses the education, training, 
ability, moral character, integrity, disposi-
tion to work, adherence to reasonable rules 
and regulations, and otheT job Telated quali-
fications required by an employer for any 
particular job, job classification, or position 
to be filled or created; 
(ii) as used in this chapter, "to discrimi-
nate in matters of compensation" means the 
payment of differing wages or salaries to em-
ployees having substantially equal experi-
ence, responsibilities, and skill for the par-
ticular job. However, nothing in this chapter 
prevents increases in pay as a result of lon-
gevity with the employer, if the salary in-
creases are uniformly applied and available 
.3 all employees on a substantially propor-
tional basis. Nothing in this section pro-
hibits an employer and employee from agree-
ing to a rate of pay or work schedule de-
signed to protect the employee from loss of 
Social Security payment or benefits if the 
employee is eligible for those payments; 
(b) for an employment agency: 
(i) to refuse to list and properly classify for 
employment, or to refuse to refer an individ-
ual for employment, in a known available job 
for which the individual is otherwise quali-
fied, because of race, color, sex, pregnancy, 
childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, 
religion, national origin, age, if the individ-
ual is 40 years of age or older, or handicap; 
(ii) to comply with a request from an em-
ployer for referral of applicants for employ-
ment if the request indicates either directly 
or indirectly that the employer discriminates 
in employment on account of race, color, sex, 
pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related 
conditions, religion, national origin, age, if 
the individual is 40 years of age or older, or 
handicap; 
(c) for a labor organization to exclude any indi-
vidual otherwise qualified from full membership 
rights in the labor organization, or to expel the 
individual from membership in the labor organi-
zation, or to otherwise discriminate against or 
harass any of its members in full employment of 
work opportunity, or representation, because of 
race, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-re-
lated conditions, religion, national origin, age, if 
the individual is 40 years of age or older, or 
handicap; 
(d) for any employer, employment agency, or 
labor organization to print, or circulate, or cause 
to be printed or circulated, any statement, adver-
tisement, or publication, or to use any form of 
application for employment or membership, or to 
make any inquiry in connection with prospective 
employment or membership, which expresses, ei-
ther directly or indirectly, any limitation, specifi-
cation, or discrimination as to race, color, reli-
gion, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-re-
lated conditions, national origin, age, if the indi-
vidual is 40 years of age or older, or handicap or 
intent to make any such limitation, specification, 
or discrimination; unless based upon a bona fide 
occupational qualification, or required by, and 
given to, an agency of government for security 
reasons; 
(e) for any person, whether or not an employer, 
an employment agency, a labor organization, or 
the employees or members thereof, to aid, incite, 
compel, or coerce the doing of an act defined in 
this section to be a discriminatory or prohibited 
employment practice; or to obstruct or prevent 
any peTson from complying \*ith th is chapter, or 
any order issued under it; or to attempt, either 
directly or indirectly, to commit any act prohib-
ited in this section; 
(f) for any employer, labor organization, joint 
apprenticeship committee, or vocational school, 
providing, coordinating, or controlling appren-
ticeship programs, or providing, coordinating, or 
controlling on-the-job-training programs, in-
struction, training, or retraining programs: 
(i) to deny to, or withhold from, any quali-
fied person, because of race, color, sex, preg-
nancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related con-
ditions, religion, national origin, age, if the ' 
individual is 40 years of age or older, or 
handicap the right to be admitted to, or par-
ticipate in any apprenticeship training pro-
gram, on-the-job-training program, or other 
occupational instruction, training or retrain-
ing program; 
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(n) to discriminate against or harass any 
qualified person in that person's pursuit of 
such programs, or to discriminate against 
such a person in the terms, conditions, or 
privileges of such programs, because of race, 
color, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or preg-
nancy-related conditions, religion, national 
origin, age, if the individual is 40 years of 
age or older, or handicap, 
(in) to print, or publish, or cause to be 
printed or published any notice or advertise 
ment relating to employment by the em-
ployer, or membership in or any classifica-
tion or referral for employment by a labor 
organization, or relating to any classification 
or referral for employment by an employ-
ment agency, indicating any preference, lim-
itation, specification, or discrimination 
based on race, color, sex, pregnancy, child-
birth, or pregnancy-related conditions, reli-
gion, national origin, age, if the individual is 
40 years of age or older, or handicap except 
that a notice or advertisement may indicate 
a preference, limitation, specification, or dis-
crimination based on race, color, religion, 
sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-re-
lated conditions, age, national origin, or 
handicap when religion, race, color, sex, age, 
national origin, or handicap is a bona fide 
occupational qualification for employment 
othmg contained in Subsections (l)(a) through 
") shall be construed to prevent the termination of 
•loyment of an individual who is physically, men-
p, or emotionally unable to perform the duties re-
*ed by that individual's employment, or to pre-
le the variance of insurance premiums, of cover-
on account of age, or affect any restriction upon 
activities of individuals licensed by the liquor au-
lty with respect to persons under 21 years of age 
) (a) It is not a discriminatory or prohibited em-
ployment practice 
(l) for an employer to hire and employ em-
ployees, for an employment agency to clas-
sify or refer for employment any individual, 
for a labor organization to classify its mem-
bership or to classify or refer for employment 
any individual or for an employer, labor or-
ganization, or joint labor-management com-
mittee controlling apprenticeship or other 
training or retraining programs to admit or 
employ any individual in any such program, 
on the basis of religion, sex, pregnancy, 
childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, 
age, national origin, or handicap m those 
certain instances where religion, sex, preg-
nancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related con-
ditions, age, if the individual is 40 years of 
age or older, national origin, or handicap is a 
bona fide occupational qualification reason-
ably necessary to the normal operation of 
that particular business or enterprise, 
(n) for a school, college, university, or 
other educational institution to hire and em-
ploy employees of a particular religion if the 
school, college, university, or other educa-
tional institution is, in whole or in substan-
tial part, owned, supported, controlled, or 
managed by a particular religious corpora-
tion, association, or societv, or if the curricu-
lum of the school college univer<;itv, or 
other educational institution is directed to-
ward the propagation of a particular reli-
gion. 
(in) for an employer to give preference in 
employment to his own spouse son, son-in-
law, daughter, daughter-in-law, or to any 
person for whom the employer is or would be 
liable to furnish financial support if those 
persons were unemployed, or for an em-
ployer to give preference in employment to 
any person to whom the employer during the 
preceding six months has furnished more 
than one-half of total financial support re-
gardless of whether or not the employer was 
or is legally obligated to furnish support, or 
for an employer to give preference in employ-
ment to any person whose education or train-
ing was substantially financed by the em-
ployer for a period of two years or more 
(b) Nothing contained in this chapter applies 
to any business or enterprise on or near an In-
dian reservation with respect to any publicly an-
nounced employment practice of the business or 
enterprise under which preferential treatment is 
given to any individual because he is a native 
American Indian living on or near an Indian res-
ervation 
(c) Nothing contained m this chapter shall be 
interpreted to require any employer, employment 
agency, labor organization, vocational school, 
joint labor-management committee, or appren-
ticeship program subject to this chapter to grant 
preferential treatment to any individual or to 
any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, 
age, national origin, or handicap of the individ-
ual or group on account of an imbalance which 
may exist with respect to the total number or 
percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, 
sex, age, national origin, or handicap employed 
by any employer, referred or classified for em-
ployment by an employment agency or labor or-
ganization, admitted to membership or classified 
by any labor organization, or admitted to or em-
ployed in, any apprenticeship or other training 
program, in comparison with the total number or 
percentage of persons of that race, color, religion, 
sex, age, national origin, or handicap in any com-
munity or county or in the available work force 
in any community or county 
(3) It is not a discriminatory or prohibited practice 
with respect to age to observe the terms of a bona fide 
seniority system or any bona fide employment benefit 
plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan 
which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of 
this chapter except that no such employee benefit 
plan shall excuse the failure to hire any individual 
(4) Notwithstanding Subsection (3), or any other 
statutory provision to the contrary, other than Sub-
section (5) and Section 67-5-8, and except where age 
is a bona fide occupational qualification, no person 
shall be subject to involuntary termination or retire-
ment from employment on the basis of age alone, if 
the individual is 40 years of age or older 
(5) Nothing in this section prohibits compulsory re-
tirement of an employee who has attained at least 65 
years of age, and who, for the two-year period imme-
diately before retirement, is employed in a bona fide 
executive or a high policymaking position, if that em-
ployee is entitled to an immediate nonforfeitable an-
nual retirement benefit from his employer's pension, 
profit-sharing savings, or deferred compensation 
plan or anv combination of those plans which bene-
fit equals, in the aggregate, at least $44,000 1989 
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34-35-7. Repealed. 1965 
34-35-7.1. Procedure for aggrieved person to 
file claim — Investigations — Adjudi-
cative proceedings — Settlement — Re-
consideration — Determination. 
(1) (a) Any person claiming to be aggrieved by a 
discriminatory or prohibited employment prac-
tice may by himself, his attorney, or his agent, 
make, sign, and file with the commresion a re-
quest for agency action 
(b) Every request for agency action shall be 
verified under oath or affirmation 
(c) A request for agency action made under 
this section shall be filed within 180 days after 
the alleged discriminatory or prohibited employ-
ment practice occurred 
(2) Any employer, labor organization, joint appren-
ticeship committee, or vocational school who has em-
ployees or members who refuse or threaten to refuse 
to comply with the provisions of this chapter may file 
with the commission a request for agency action ask-
ing the commission for assistance to obtain their com-
pliance by conciliation or other remedial action 
(3) (a) Before a hearing is set or held as part of any 
adjudicative proceeding, the commission shall 
promptly assign an investigator to attempt a set-
tlement between the parties by conference, con-
ciliation, or persuasion 
(b) If no settlement is reached, the investiga-
tor shall make a prompt impartial investigation 
of all allegations made m the request for agency 
action 
(c) The commission and its staff, agents, and 
employees shall conduct every investigation in 
fairness to all parties and agencies involved, and 
may not attempt a settlement between the par-
ties if it is clear that no discriminatory or prohib-
ited employment practice has occurred 
(d) If the aggrieved party wishes to withdraw 
the request for agency action, he must do so prior 
to the issuance of a final order 
(4) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are un-
successful, and the investigator uncovers insuffi-
cient evidence during his investigation to sup-
port the allegations of a discriminatory or prohib-
ited employment practice set out in the request 
for agency action, the investigator shall formally 
report these findings to the director 
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report, 
the director may issue a determination and order 
for dismissal of the adjudicative proceeding 
(c) A party may make a written request to the 
director for an evidentiary hearing to review de 
novo the director's determination and order 
within 30 days of the date of the determination 
and order for dismissal 
(d) If the director receives no timely request 
for a hearing, the determination and order issued 
by the director becomes the final order of the 
commission 
(5) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are un-
successful and the investigator uncovers suffi-
cient evidence during his investigation to sup-
port the allegations of a discriminatory or prohib-
ited employment practice set out in the request 
for agency action, the investigator shall formally 
report these findings to the director 
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report 
the director mav issue a determination and order 
based on the investigator's report 
(c) A party may file a written request to the 
director for an evidentiary hearing to review de 
novo the director's determination and order 
within 30 days of the date of the determination 
and order 
(d) If the director receives no timely request 
for a hearing, the determination and order issued 
by the director requiring the respondent to cease 
any discriminatory or prohibited employment 
practice and to provide relief to the aggrieved 
party becomes the final order of the commission 
(6) In any adjudicative proceeding, the investigator 
who investigated the matter may not participate m a 
hearing except as a witness, nor may he participate 
in the deliberations of the presiding officer 
(7) Prior to commencement of an evidentiary hear-
ing, the party filing the request for agency action 
may reasonably and fairly amend any allegation, and 
the respondent may amend its answer Those amend-
ments may be made during or after a hearing but 
only with permission of the presiding officer 
(8) (a) If, upon all the evidence at a hearing, the 
presiding officer finds that a respondent has not 
engaged in a discriminatory or prohibited em-
ployment practice, the presiding officer shall is-
sue an order dismissing the request for agency 
action containing the allegation of a discrimina-
tory or prohibited employment practice 
(b) The presiding officer may order that the 
respondent be reimbursed by the complaining 
party for his attorneys' fees and costs 
(9) If upon all the evidence at the hearing, the pre-
siding officer finds that a respondent has engaged in 
a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice, 
the presiding officer shall issue an order requiring 
the respondent to cease any discriminatory or prohib-
ited employment practice and to provide relief to the 
complaining party, including reinstatement, back 
pay and benefits, and attorneys' fees and costs 
(10) Conciliation between the parties is to be urged 
and facilitated at all stages of the adjudicative pro-
cess 
(11) (a) Either party may file a written request for 
review of the order issued by the presiding officer 
in accordance with Section 63-46b-12 
(b) If there is no timely request for review the 
order issued by the presiding officer becomes the 
final order of the commission 
(12) An order of the commission under Subsection 
(ll)(a) is subject to judicial review as provided in Sec-
tion 63-46b-16 
(13) The commission shall have authority to make 
rules concerning procedures under this chapter in ac-
cordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Admmis 
trative Rulemaking Act 
(14) The members of the commission and its staff 
may not divulge or make public any information 
gained from any investigation, settlement negotia-
tion, or proceeding before the commission except in 
the following 
(a) Information used by the director in making 
any determination may be provided to all inter-
ested parties for the purpose of preparation for 
and participation m proceedings before the com-
mission 
(b) General statistical information may be dis-
closed provided the identities of the individuals 
or parties are not disclosed 
(c) Information may be disclosed for inspection 
by the attorney general or other legal represents 
tives of the state or commission 
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(d) Information may be disclosed for informa-
tion and reporting requirements of the federal 
government. 
(15) The procedures contained in this section are 
the exclusive remedy under state law for employment 
discrimination based upon race, color, sex, retalia-
tion, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related con-
ditions, age, religion, national origin, or handicap. 
(16) The commencement of an action under federal 
law for relief based upon any act prohibited by this 
chapter bars the commencement or continuation of 
any adjudicative proceeding before the Utah Antidis-
crimination Division in connection with tlfe same 
claims under this chapter. Nothing in this subsection 
is intended to alter, amend, modify, or impair the 
exclusive remedy provision set forth in Subsection 
(15). 1991 
34-35-8. Repealed. 
CHAPTER 36 
TRANSPORTATION OF WORKERS 
Section 
34-36-1. 
34-36-2. 
34-36-3. 
34-36-4. 
Motor vehicles of employers — Safe 
maintenance and operation. 
Motor vehicles of employers — Rules 
and regulations. 
Carriers and vehicles of United States 
exempt. 
Agricultural workers exempt. 
34-36-1. Motor vehicles of employers — Safe 
maintenance and operation. 
Every motor vehicle furnished by an employer to be 
used to transport one or more workers to and from 
their places of employment shall be maintained in a 
safe condition and operated in a safe manner at all 
times, whether or not used on a public highway. 1969 
34-36-2. Motor vehicles of employers — Rules 
and regulations. 
The state industrial commission shall make and 
enforce reasonable rules and regulations relating to 
such motor vehicles used to transport workers to and 
from their places of employment. These rules and reg-
ulations shall be embodied in a safety code and shall 
establish minimum standards. 1969 
34-36-3. Carriers and vehicles of United States 
exempt. 
This chapter shall not apply to motor carriers or to 
motor vehicles owned and operated by the United 
States. 1969 
34-36-4. Agricultural workers exempt. 
The provisions of this chapter do not apply to agri-
cultural workers. 1969 
CHAPTER 37 
DECEPTION DETECTION EXAMINERS 
^Renumbered by Laws 1993, ch. 234, §§ 201 to 
214.) 
34-37-1 to 34-37-16. Renumbered as §S 53-5-301 to 
53-5-314. 
CHAPTER 38 
DRUG AND ALCOHOL TESTING 
Section 
34-38-1. Legislative findings — Purpose and in-
tent of chapter. 
34-38-2. Definitions. 
34-38-3. Testing for drugs or alcohol. 
34-38-4. Samples — Identification and collection. 
34-38-5. Time of testing — Cost of testing and 
transportation. 
34-38-6. Requirements for collection and testing. 
34-38-7. Employer's written testing policy — 
Purposes and requirements for collec-
tion and testing — Employer's use of 
test results. 
34-38-8. Employer's disciplinary or rehabilitative 
actions. 
34-38-9. No cause of action arises for failure to 
test or detect substance or problem, or 
for termination of testing program. 
34-38-10. No cause of action arises against em-
ployer unless false test result — Pre-
sumption and limitation of damages 
in claim against employer. 
34-38-11. Bases for cause of action for defamation, 
libel, slander, or damage to reputa-
tion. 
34-38-12. No cause of action arises based on fail-
ure of employer to establish testing 
program. 
34-38-13. Confidentiality of information. 
34-38-14. Employee not "handicapped." 
34-38-15. No physician-patient relationship cre-
ated. 
34-38-1. Legislative findings — Purpose and in-
tent of chapter. 
The Legislature finds that a healthy and produc-
tive work force, safe working conditions free from the 
effects of drugs and ^alcohol, and maintenance of the 
quality of products produced and services rendered in 
this state, are important to employers, employees, 
and the general public. The Legislature further finds 
that the abuse of drugs and alcohol creates a variety 
of workplace problems, including increased injuries 
on the job, increased absenteeism, increased financial 
burden on health and benefit programs, increased 
workplace theft, decreased employee morale, de-
creased productivity, and a decline in the quality of 
products and services. 
Therefore, in balancing the interests of employers, 
employees, and the welfare of the general public, the 
Legislature finds that fair and equitable testing for 
drugs and alcohol in the workplace, in accordance 
with this chapter, is in the best interest of all parties. 
The Legislature does not intend to prohibit any em-
ployee from seeking damages or job reinstatement, if 
action was taken by his employer based on a false 
drug or alcohol test result. 1987 
34-38-2. Definitions. 
For purposes of this chapter: 
(1) "Alcohol" means ethyl alcohol or ethanol. 
(2) "Drugs" means any substance recognized 
as a drug in the United States Pharmacopoeia, 
the National Formulary, the Homeopathic Phar-
macopoeia, or other drug compendia, or supple-
ment to any of those compendia 
(3) "Employer" means any person, firm, or cor-
poration, including any public utility or transit 
district, which has one or more workers or opera-
j ^ 
j^ons known to have a direct interest in the re-
^ ^ted agency action as specified in Section 
^U6b-3(3)(b), U.C.A., shall be the charging party 
A the respondent/employer. 
? CLASSIFICATION OF PROCEEDING FOR 
Pi-RPOSE OF UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCE-
pCBES ACT 
Pursuant to Section 63-46b-4(l), U.C.A., the proce-
dures specified in Section 34-35-7.1UM5), U.C.A., are 
n informal process with no hearing and are gov-
*iTTied by Section 63-46b-5, U.C.A. Any settlement 
inferences scheduled pursuant to Section 
u-35-7 K3)(a), U.C.A., are not adjudicative hearings. 
G PRESIDING OFFICER 
for those procedures specified in Section 
14-35-7-K1H5), U.C.A., the presiding officer shall be 
:he Director or the Director's designee. The presiding 
officer for the formal hearing referred to in Section 
34-35-7.H6M11), U.C.A., shall be appointed by the 
Commission. 
R560-1-4. Procedures — Initial Decision Making 
and Review. 
The following rules pertain to the procedures speci-
fied in Section 34-35-7.1, U.C.A. 
A For purposes of requesting review of the initial 
Determination and Order, the following provisions 
and those of Section 63-46b-12, U.C.A., shall apply: 
1 The initial Determination and Order of the Divi-
sion, after the completion of an investigation on a 
charge of discrimination, shall be issued by the Direc-
tor The Director may request that the Commission's 
legal staff review an investigatory file and make a 
recommendation to the Director prior to the issuance 
of the initial Determination and Order. The Director 
may refer a request for agency action back to an in-
\estigator for further investigation when necessary. 
2 Division Orders, referred to in Rule R560-1-4.A.1 
as the initial Determination and Order, are not final 
Commission Orders until either the time to file a 
written request to the Director for an evidentiary 
heanng to review de novo the Director's Determina-
tion and Order has expired or until the Order is af-
firmed in a Commission Order on review per Section 
63-46b-12, U.C.A. 
3 A request for an evidentiary hearing to review de 
novo the Director's Determination and Order must be 
in writing and submitted to the Director within 30 
days of the date of the initial Determination and Or-
der 
4 A request for an evidentiary hearing must state 
a reason why the hearing is necessary. A hearing will 
not be considered necessary if the hearing will not 
add to the evidence in the investigatory file or cause 
the evidence in the investigatory file to be viewed 
differently. In most cases, the need to cross-examine 
the individuals who have submitted affidavits sup-
portive of the initial finding or determination of the 
Commission will be considered a valid reason for 
granting a request for a hearing by the Commission. 
5 Either party may file a written request for re-
view of the presiding officer's Order in accordance 
*»th Section 63-46b-12, U.C.A. 
B. Where the complaint is one of handicap discrimi-
nation, whether risk of future injury or increased cost 
of insurance coverage will be allowed as a defense to 
handicap discrimination will be at the discretion of 
lhe Division and shall be dealt with on a case-by-case 
hasis subject to the following limitations: 
1 The respondent/employer seeking to use the de-
fense of risk of future injury must provide reliable 
Medical evidence showing a causal connection be-
tween the increased risk of future injury and the 
handicap alleged to cause the increased risk. 
2. The respondent/employer seeking to use the de-
fense of increased cost of insurance premium must 
show with verified documentary evidence that a sig-
nificant insurance premium increase would occur if 
the charging party were hired or remained in the 
position at issue. 
C. It shall be the practice of the Division to rely on 
federal case law regarding discrimination in inter-
preting the Act in cases where the federal law being 
interpreted by the courts closely parallels the Act and 
where state law interpretation is non-existent. 
R560-1-5. Classification of Proceeding for Pur-
pose of Utah Administrative Procedures Act. 
The adjudicative proceeding referred to in Section 
34-35-7.K6H10), U.C.A., is a formal adjudicative 
hearing which shall occur following the investigation 
process referred to in Section 34-35-7.K1M5), U.C.A. 
The formal hearing shall be held after the Director 
sends the request for an evidentiary hearing to the 
Legal Counsel, who will ensure that the require-
ments imposed by Rule R560-1-4.A.3 and 4 have been 
satisfied and that a formal hearing is necessary to 
finally resolve the matter and when it is appropriate 
pursuant to Section 63-46b-4(3), U.C.A. 
R560-1-6. Declaratory Orders. 
A. PURPOSE 
As required by Section 63-46b-21, this rule pro-
vides the procedures for submission, review, and dis-
position of petitions for agency Declaratory Orders on 
the applicability of statutes, rules, and Orders gov-
erning or issued by the agency. 
B. PETITION FORM AND FILING 
1. The petition shall be addressed and delivered to 
the Director, who shall mark the petition with the 
date of receipt. 
2. The petition shall: 
(a) be clearly designated as a request for an agency 
Declaratory Order; 
(b) identify the statute, rule, or Order to be re-
viewed; 
(c) describe in detail the situation or circumstances 
in which applicability is to be reviewed; 
(d) describe the reason or need for the applicability 
review, addressing in particular why the review 
should not be considered frivolous; 
(e) include an address and telephone where the pe-
titioner can be contacted during regular work days; 
(f) declare whether the petitioner has participated 
in a completed or on-going adjudicative proceeding 
concerning the same issue within the past 12 months; 
and 
(g) be signed by the petitioner. 
C. REVIEWABILITY 
The agency shall not review a petition for a Declar-
atory Order that is: 
1. not within the jurisdiction and competence of the 
agency; 
2. trivial, irrelevant, or immaterial; or 
3. otherwise excluded by state or federal law. 
D. PETITION REVIEW AND DISPOSITION 
1. The Director shall promptly review and consider 
the petition and may: 
(a) meet with the petitioner; 
(b) consult with Legal Counsel; or 
(c) take any action consistent with law that the 
agency deems necessary to provide the petition ade-
quate review and due consideration. 
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dv) a copy of the rule or proposed rule, if 
any, 
(v) an allegation tha t he has ei ther ex 
hausted the adminis t ra t ive remedies by com-
plying with Section 63-46a-12 or met the re-
quirements for waiver of exhaustion of ad-
ministrat ive remedies established by Sub-
section (2)(b), 
(vi) the relief sought, and 
(vn) factual and legal allegations support-
ing the relief sought 
(b) (1) The plaintiff shall serve a summons and 
a copy of the complaint as required by the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(n) The defendants shall file a responsive 
pleading as required by the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedures 
(in) The agency shall file the adminis t ra-
tive record of the rule, if any, with i ts respon-
sive pleading 
(4) The district court may gran t relief to the peti-
t ioner by 
(a) declaring the rule invalid, if the court finds 
that 
(I) the rule violates constitutional or stat-
utory law or the agency does not have legal 
authority to make the rule, 
(II) the rule is not supported by substan-
tial evidence when viewed in l ight of the 
whole adminis t ra t ive record, or 
(in) the agency did not follow proper rule-
making procedure, 
(b) declaring the rule nonapphcable to the pe-
titioner, 
(c) remanding the ma t t e r to the aeency for 
compliance with proper ru lemaking procedures 
or further fact-finding, 
(d) ordering the agency to comply wi th Section 
63-46a-3, 
(e) issuing a judicial s tay or injunction to en-
join the agency from illegal action or action t h a t 
would cause i r reparable h a r m to the petit ioner, 
or 
(f) any combination of Subsections (a) through 
(e) 
(5) If the plaintiff meets the requirements of Sub-
section (2Kb) the district court may review and act on 
a complaint under th is section whether or not the 
plaintiff has requested the agency review under Sec 
tion 63-46a-12 1990 
63-46a-13. Repealed. 1990 
63-46a-14. Time for contesting a rule. 
A proceeding to contest any rule on the ground of 
noncompliance with the procedural requirements of 
this chapter shall commence within two years of the 
effective date of the rule. 1965 
63-46a-15. Repealed. 1988 
63-46a-16. Utah Administrative Code as official 
compilation of rules — Judicial notice. 
The code shall be received by all the judges, public 
officers, commissions, and departments of the state 
government as evidence of the administrative law of 
the state of Utah and as an authorized compilation of 
the administrative law of Utah All courts shall take 
judicial notice of the code and its provisions 1992 
CHAPTER 46b 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT 
Section 
63-46b 0 5 Short title 
63-46b 1 Scope and applicability of chapter 
63-46b-2 Definitions 
63-46b-3 Commencement of adjudicatne pro-
ceedings 
63-46b-4 Designation of adjudicative proceed-
ings as formal or informal 
63-46b-5 Procedures for informal adjudicative 
proceedings 
63-46b-6 Procedures for formal adjudicative 
proceedings — Responsive plead-
ings 
63-46b-7 Procedures for formal adjudicative 
proceedings — Discovery and sub-
poenas 
63-46b-8 Procedures for formal adjudicative 
proceedings — Hearing procedure 
63-46b-9 Procedures for formal adjudicative 
proceedings — Intervention 
63-46b-10 Procedures for formal adjudicative 
proceedings — Orders 
63-46b-ll Default 
63-46b-12 Agency review — Procedure 
63-46b-13 Agency review — Reconsideration 
63-46b-14 Judicial review — Exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies 
63-46b-15 Judicial review — Informal adjudica-
tive proceedings 
63-46b-16 Judicial review — Formal adjudica-
tive proceedings 
63-46b-17 Judicial review — Type of relief 
63-46b-18 Judicial review — Stay and other tem-
porary remedies pending final dis-
position 
63-46b-19 Civil enforcement 
63-46b-20 Emergency adjudicative proceedings 
63-46b-21 Declaratory orders 
63-46b-22 Transition procedures 
63-46b-0.5. Short title. 
This act is known as the "Administrative Proce-
dures Act " 1991 
63-46b-l. Scope and applicability of chapter. 
(1) Except as set forth in Subsection (2), and except 
as otherwise provided by a s ta tu te superseding provi-
sions of th is chapter by explicit reference to th is chap-
ter, the provisions of this chapter apply to every 
agency of the s ta te of Utah and govern 
(a) all state agency actions that determine the 
legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or 
other legal interests of one or more identifiable 
persons, including all agency actions to grant, 
deny, revoke, suspend, modify, annul, withdraw, 
or amend an authority, right, or license, and 
(b) judicial review of all such actions 
(2) This chapter does not govern 
(a) the procedures for promulgation of agency 
rules, or the judicial review of those procedures 
or rules, 
(b) the issuance of any notice of a deficiency in 
the payment of a tax, the decision to waive penal-
t ies or interest on taxes , t he imposition of, and 
penal t ies or in teres t on, taxes, or the issuance of 
any tax assessment, except t h a t th is chapter gov-
erns any agency action commenced by a taxpayer 
or by another person authorized by law to contest 
the validity or correctness of those actions, 
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(c) state agency actions relating to extradition, 
to the granting of pardons or parole, commuta-
tions or terminations of sentences, or to the re-
scission, termination, or revocation of parole or 
probation, to actions and decisions of the Psychi-
atric Security Review Board relating to dis-
charge, conditional release, or retention of per-
sons under its jurisdiction, to the discipline of, 
resolution of grievances of, supervision of, con-
finement of, or the treatment of inmates or resi-
dents of any correctional facility, the Utah State 
Hospital, the Utah State Developmental Center, 
or persons in the custody or jurisdiction of the 
Division of Mental Health, or persons on proba-
tion or parole, or judicial review of those actions; 
(d) state agency actions to evaluate, discipline, 
employ, transfer, reassign, or promote students 
or teachers in any school or educational institu-
tion, or judicial review of those actions; 
(e) applications for employment and internal 
personnel actions within an agency concerning 
its own employees, or judicial review of those ac-
tions; 
(f) the issuance of any citation or assessment 
under Title 35, Chapter 9, Utah Occupational 
Safety and Health Act of 1973, and Title 58, 
Chapter 55, Utah Construction Trades Licensing 
Act, except that this chapter governs any agency 
action commenced by the employer, licensee, or 
other person authorized by law to contest the va-
lidity or correctness of such a citation or assess-
ment; 
(g) state agency actions relating to manage-
ment of state funds, the management and dis-
posal of school and institutional trust land assets, 
except that this chapter governs any agency's 
final action commenced by any person pursuant 
to Section 65A-1-7, and contracts for the pur-
chase or sale of products, real property, supplies, 
goods, or services by or for the state, or by or for 
an agency of the state, except as provided in such 
contracts, or judicial review of those actions; 
(h) state agency actions under Title 7, Chapter 
1, Article 3, Powers and Duties of Commissioner 
of Financial Institutions, and Title 7, Chapter 2, 
Possession of Depository Institution by Commis-
sioner, Title 7, Chapter 8a, Utah Industrial Loan 
Corporation Guaranty Act, Title 7, Chapter 19, 
Acquisition of Failing Depository Institutions or 
Holding Companies, and Title 63, Chapter 30, 
Governmental Immunity Act, or judicial review 
of those actions; 
(i) the initial determination of any person's el-
igibility for unemployment benefits, the initial 
determination of any person's eligibility for bene-
fits under Title 35, Chapter 1. Worker's Compen-
sation, and Title 35, Chapter 2, Utah Occupa-
tional Disease Disability Law, or the initial de-
termination of a person's unemployment tax lia-
bility; 
(j) state agency actions relating to the distri-
bution or award of monetary grants to or be-
tween governmental units, or for research, devel-
opment, or the arts, or judicial review of those 
actions; 
(k) the issuance of any notice of violation or 
order under Title 26, Chapter 8, Utah Emergency 
Medical Services System Act. Title 19, Chapter 5, 
Water Quality Act, Title 19. Chapter 4, Safe 
Drinking Water Act, Title 19. Chapter 2, Air 
Conservation Act, or Title 19. Chapter 6, Part 1, 
Solid and Hazardous Waste Act, except that this 
chapter governs any agency action commenced 
by any person authorized by law to contest the 
validity or correctness of any such notice or or-
der; 
(1) state agency actions, to the extent required 
by federal statute or regulation to be conducted 
according to federal procedures; 
(m) the initial determination of any person's 
eligibility for government or public assistance 
benefits; 
(n) state agency actions relating to wildlife li-
censes, permits, tags, and certificates of registra-
tion; 
(o) licenses for use of state recreational facili-
ties; and 
(p) state agency actions under Title 63, Chap-
ter 2, Government Records Access and Manage-
ment Act, except as provided in Section 63-2-603. 
(3) This chapter does not affect any legal remedies 
otherwise available to: 
(a) compel an agency to take action; or 
(b) challenge an agency's rule. 
(4) This chapter does not preclude an agency, prior 
to the beginning of an adjudicative proceeding, or the 
presiding officer during an adjudicative proceeding 
from: 
(a) requesting or ordering conferences with 
parties and interested persons to: 
(i) encourage settlement; 
(ii) clarify the issues; 
(iii) simplify the evidence; 
(iv) facilitate discovery; or 
(v) expedite the proceedings; or 
(b) granting a timely motion to dismiss or for 
summary judgment if the requirements of Rule 
12(b) or Rule 56, respectively, of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure are met by the moving party, 
except to the extent that the requirements of 
those rules are modified by this chapter. 
(5) (a) Declaratory proceedings authorized by Sec-
tion 63-46b-21 are not governed by this chapter, 
except as explicitly provided in that section. 
(b) Judicial review of declaratory proceedings 
authorized by Section 63-46b-21 are governed by 
this chapter. 
(6) This chapter does not preclude an agency from 
enacting rules affecting or governing adjudicative 
proceedings or from following any of those rules, if 
the rules are enacted according to the procedures out-
lined in Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act, and if the rules conform to the re-
quirements of this chapter. 
(7) (a) If the attorney general issues a written de-
termination that any provision of this chapter 
would result in the denial of funds or services to 
an agency of the state from the federal govern-
ment, the applicability of those provisions to that 
agency shall be suspended to the extent neces-
sary to prevent the denial. 
(b) The attorney general shall report the sus-
pension to the Legislature at its next session. 
(8) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to 
provide an independent basis for jurisdiction to re-
view final agency action. 
(9) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to 
restrict a presiding officer, for good cause shown, 
from lengthening or shortening any time period pre-
scribed in this chapter, except those time periods es-
tablished for judicial review. 1993 
63-46b-2. Definitions. 
(1) As used in this chapter: 
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(a) "Adjudicative proceeding" means an 
agency action or proceeding described in Section 
63-46b-l. 
(b) "Agency" means a board, commission, de-
partment, division, officer, council, office, com-
mittee, bureau, or other administrative unit of 
this state, including the agency head, agency em-
ployees, or other persons acting on behalf of or 
under the authority of the agency head, but does 
not mean the Legislature, the courts, the gover-
nor, any political subdivision of the state, or any 
administrative unit of a political subdivision of 
the state. 
(c) "Agency head" means an individual or body 
of individuals in whom the ultimate legal author-
ity of the agency is vested by statute. 
(d) "Declaratory proceeding" means a proceed-
ing authorized and governed by Section 
63-46b-21. 
(e) "License" means a franchise, permit, certi-
fication, approval, registration, charter, or simi-
lar form of authorization required by statute. 
(f) "Party" means the agency or other person 
commencing an adjudicative proceeding, all re-
spondents, all persons permitted by the presiding 
officer to intervene in the proceeding, and all per-
sons authorized by statute or agency rule to par-
ticipate as parties in an adjudicative proceeding. 
(g) "Person" means an individual, group of in-
dividuals, partnership, corporation, association, 
political subdivision or its units, governmental 
subdivision or its units, public or private organi-
zation or entity of any character, or another 
agency. 
(h) (i) "Presiding officer" means an agency 
head, or an individual or body of individuals 
designated by the agency head, by the 
agency's rules, or by statute to conduct an 
adjudicative proceeding. 
(ii) If fairness to the parties is not compro-
mised, an agency may substitute one presid-
ing officer for another during any proceed-
ing. 
(iii) A person who acts as a presiding offi-
cer at one phase of a proceeding need not 
continue as presiding officer through all 
phases of a proceeding. 
(i) "Respondent" means a person against 
whom an adjudicative proceeding is initiated, 
whether by an agency or any other person. 
Cj) "Superior agency" means an agency re-
quired or authorized by law to review the orders 
of another agency. 
(2) This section does not prohibit an agency from 
designating by rule the names or titles of the agency 
head or the presiding officers with responsibility for 
adjudicative proceedings before the agency. 1988 
63-46b-3. Commencement of adjudicative pro-
ceedings. 
(1) Except as otherwise permitted by Section 
63-46b-20, all adjudicative proceedings shall be com-
menced by either: 
(a) a notice of agency action, if proceedings are 
commenced by the agency; or 
(b) a request for agency action, if proceedings 
are commenced by persons other than the 
agency. 
(2) A notice of agency action shall be filed and 
served according to the following requirements: 
(a) The notice of agency action shall be in writ-
ing, signed by a presiding officer, and shall in-
clude: 
(i) the names and mailing addresses of ail 
persons to whom notice is being given by the 
presiding officer, and the name, title, and 
mailing address of any attorney or employee 
who has been designated to appear for the 
agency; 
(ii) the agency's file number or other ref-
erence number; 
(iii) the name of the adjudicative proceed-
ing; 
(iv) the date that the notice of agency ac-
tion was mailed; 
(v) a statement of whether the adjudica-
tive proceeding is to be conducted informally 
according to the provisions of rules adopted 
under Sections 63-46b-4 and 63-46b-5, or for-
mally according to the provisions of Sections 
63-46b-6 to 63-46b-ll; 
(vi) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be 
formal, a statement that each respondent 
must file a written response within 30 days 
of the mailing date of the notice of agency 
action; 
(vii) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be 
formal, or if a hearing is required by statute 
or rule, a statement of the time and place of 
any scheduled hearing, a statement of the 
purpose for which the hearing is to be held, 
and a statement that a party who fails to 
attend or participate in the hearing may be 
held in default; 
(viii) if the adjudicative proceeding is to 
be informal and a hearing is required by 
statute or rule, or if a hearing is permitted 
by rule and may be requested by a party 
within the time prescribed by rule, a state-
ment that the parties may request a hearing 
within the time provided by the agency's 
rules; 
(ix) a statement of the legal authority and 
jurisdiction under which the adjudicative 
proceeding is to be maintained; 
(x) the name, title, mailing address, and 
telephone number of the presiding officer; 
and 
(xi) a statement of the purpose of the adju-
dicative proceeding and, to the extent known 
by the presiding officer, the questions to be 
decided. 
(b) When adjudicative proceedings are com-
menced by the agency, the agency shall: 
(i) mail the notice of agency action to each 
party; 
(ii) publish the notice of agency action, if 
required by statute; and 
(iii) mail the notice of agency action to 
any other person who has a right to notice 
under statute or rule. 
(3) (a) Where the law applicable to the agency per-
mits persons other than the agency to initiate 
adjudicative proceedings, that person's request 
for agency action shall be in writing and signed 
by the person invoking the jurisdiction of the 
agency, or by his representative, and shall in-
clude: 
(i) the names and addresses of all persons 
to whom a copy of the request for agency 
action is being sent; 
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(ii) the agency's file number or other ref-
erence number, if known; 
(iii) the date that the request for agency 
action was mailed; 
(iv) a statement of the legal authority and 
jurisdiction under which agency action is re-
quested; 
(v) a statement of the relief or action 
sought from the agency; and 
(vi) a statement of the facts and reasons 
forming the basis for relief or agency action. 
(b) The person requesting agency action shall 
file the request with the agency and shall send a 
copy by mail to each person known to have a 
direct interest in the requested agency action. 
(c) An agency may, by rule, prescribe one or 
more printed forms eliciting the information re-
quired by Subsection (3)(a) to serve as the re-
quest for agency action when completed and filed 
by the person requesting agency action. 
(d) The presiding officer shall promptly review 
a request for agency action and shall: 
(i) notify the requesting party in writing 
that the request is granted and that the ad-
judicative proceeding is completed; 
(ii) notify the requesting party in writing 
that the request is denied and, if the proceed-
ing is a formal adjudicative proceeding, that 
the party may request a hearing before the 
agency to challenge the denial; or 
(iii) notify the requesting party that fur-
ther proceedings are required to determine 
the agency's response to the request. 
(e) (i) Any notice required by Subsection 
(3)(d)(ii) shall contain the information re-
quired by Subsection 63-46b-5(l)(i) in addi-
tion to disclosure required by Subsection 
(3)(d)(ii) of this section. 
(ii) The agency shall mail any notice re-
quired by Subsection (3)(d) to all parties, ex-
cept that any notice required by Subsection 
(3)(d)(iii) may be published when publication 
is required by statute. • 
(iii) The notice required by Subsection 
(3)(d)(iii) shall: 
(A) give the agency's file number or 
other reference number; 
(B) give the name of the proceeding; 
(C) designate whether the proceeding 
is one of a category to be conducted in-
formally according to the provisions of 
rules enacted under Sections 63-46b-4 
and 63-46b-5, with citation to the appli-
cable rule authorizing that designation, 
or formally according to the provisions 
of Sections 63-46b-6 to 63-46b-ll; 
(D) in the case of a formal adjudica-
tive proceeding, and where respondent 
parties are known, state that a written 
response must be filed within 30 days of 
the date of the agency's notice if mailed, 
or within 30 days of the last publication 
date of the agency's notice, if published; 
(E) if the adjudicative proceeding is to 
be formal, or if a hearing is to be held in 
an informal adjudicative proceeding, 
state the time and place of any sched-
uled hearing, the purpose for which the 
hearing is to be held, and that a party 
who fails to attend or participate in a 
scheduled and noticed hearing may be 
held in default; 
(F) if the adjudicative proceeding is to 
be informal, and a hearing is required 
by statute or rule, or if a hearing is per-
mitted by rule and may be requested by 
a party within the time prescribed by 
rule, state the parties' right to request a 
hearing and the time within which a 
hearing may be requested under the 
agency's rules; and 
(G) give the name, title, mailing ad-
dress, and telephone number of the pre-
siding officer. 
(4) When initial agency determinations or actions 
are not governed by this chapter, but agency and judi-
cial review of those initial determinations or actions 
are subject to the provisions of this chapter, the re-
quest for agency action seeking review must be filed 
with the agency within the time prescribed by the 
agency's rules. 
(5) For designated classes of adjudicative proceed-
ings, an agency may, by rule, provide for a longer 
response time than allowed by this section, and may 
provide for a shorter response time if required or per-
mitted by applicable federal law. 
(6) Unless the agency provides otherwise by rule or 
order, applications for licenses filed under authority 
of Title 32A, Chapters 3, 4, and 5, are not considered 
to be a request for agency action under this chapter. 
(7) If the purpose of the adjudicative proceeding is 
to award a license or other privilege as to which there 
are multiple competing applicants, the agency may, 
by rule or order, conduct a single adjudicative pro-
ceeding to determine the award of that license or 
privilege. 1968 
63-46b-4. Designation of adjudicative proceed-
ings as formal or informal. 
(1) The agency may, by rule, designate categories 
of adjudicative proceedings to be conducted infor-
mally according to the procedures set forth in rules 
enacted under the authority of this chapter if: 
(a) the use of the informal procedures does not 
violate any procedural requirement imposed by a 
statute other than this chapter; 
(b) in the view of the agency, the rights of the 
parties to the proceedings will be reasonably pro-
tected by the informal procedures; 
(c) in the view of the agency, the agency's ad-
ministrative efficiency will be enhanced by cate-
gorizations; and 
(d) the cost of formal adjudicative proceedings 
outweighs the potential benefits to the public of a 
formal adjudicative proceeding. 
(2) Subject to the provisions of Subsection (3), all 
agency adjudicative proceedings not specifically des-
ignated as informal proceedings by the agency's rules 
shall be conducted formally in accordance with the 
requirements of this chapter. 
(3) Any time before a final order is issued in any 
adjudicative proceeding, the presiding officer may 
convert a formal adjudicative proceeding to an infor-
mal adjudicative proceeding, or an informal adjudica-
tive proceeding to a formal adjudicative proceeding if: 
(a) conversion of the proceeding is in the pub-
lic interest; and 
(b) conversion of the proceeding does not 
unfairly prejudice the rights of any party. 1987 
63-46b-5. Procedures for informal adjudicative 
proceedings. 
(1) If an agency enacts rules designating one or 
more categories of adjudicative proceedings as infor-
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mal adjudicative proceedings, the agency shall, by 
rule, prescribe procedures for informal adjudicative 
proceedings that include the following: 
(a) Unless the agency by rule provides for and 
requires a response, no answer or other pleading 
responsive to the allegations contained in the no-
tice of agency action or the request for agency 
action need be filed. 
(b) The agency shall hold a hearing if a hear-
ing is required by statute or rule, or if a hearing 
is permitted by rule and is requested by a party 
within the time prescribed by rule. 
(c) In any hearing, the parties named in the 
notice of agency action or in the request for 
agency action shall be permitted to testify, 
present evidence, and comment on the issues. 
(d) Hearings will be held only after timely no-
tice to all parties. 
(e) Discovery is prohibited, but the agency 
may issue subpoenas or other orders to compel 
production of necessary evidence. 
(f) AH parties shall have access to information 
contained in the agency's files and to all mate-
rials and information gathered in any investiga-
tion, to the extent permitted by law. 
(g) Intervention is prohibited, except that the 
agency may enact rules permitting intervention 
where a federal statute or rule requires that a 
state permit intervention. 
(h) All hearings shall be open to all parties, 
(i) Within a reasonable time after the close of 
an informal adjudicative proceeding, the presid-
ing officer shall issue a signed order in writing 
that states the following: 
(i) the decision; 
(ii) the reasons for the decision; 
(iii) a notice of any right of administrative 
or judicial review available to the parties; 
and 
(iv) the time limits for filing an appeal or 
requesting a review, 
(j) The presiding officer's order shall be based 
on the facts appearing in the agency's files and 
on the facts presented in evidence at any hear-
ings. 
(k) A copy of the presiding officer's order shall 
be promptly mailed to each of the parties. 
(2) (a) The agency may record any hearing. 
(b) Any party, at his own expense, may have a 
reporter approved by the agency prepare a tran-
script from the agency's record of the hearing. 
(3) Nothing in this section restricts or precludes 
any investigative right or power given to an agency 
by another statute. 1988 
63-46b~6. Procedures for formal adjudicative 
proceedings — Responsive pleadings. 
(1) In all formal adjudicative proceedings, unless 
modified by rule according to Subsection 63-46b-3(5), 
the respondent, if any, shall file and serve a written 
response signed by the respondent or his representa-
tive within 30 days of the mailing date or last date of 
publication of the notice of agency action or the notice 
under Subsection 63-46b-3(3)(d), which shall include: 
(a) the agency's file number or other reference 
number; 
(b) the name of the adjudicative proceeding; 
(c) a statement of the relief that the respon-
dent seeks; 
(d) a statement of the facts; and 
le) a statement summarizing the reasons that 
the relief requested should be granted. 
(2) The response shall be filed with the agency and 
one copy shall be sent by mail to each party. 
(3) The presiding officer, or the agency by rule, 
may permit or require pleadings in addition to the 
notice of agency action, the request for agency action, 
and the response. All papers permitted or required to 
be filed shall be filed with the agency and one copy 
shall be sent by mail to each party. 1988 
63-46b-7. Procedures for formal adjudicative 
proceedings — Discovery and sub-
poenas. 
(1) In formal adjudicative proceedings, the agency 
may, by rule, prescribe means of discovery adequate 
to permit the parties to obtain all relevant informa-
tion necessary to support their claims or defenses. If 
the agency does not enact rules under this section, 
the parties may conduct discovery according to the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(2) Subpoenas and other orders to secure the atten-
dance of witnesses or the production of evidence in 
formal adjudicative proceedings shall be issued by the 
presiding officer when requested by any party, or 
may be issued by the presiding officer on his own 
motion. 
(3) Nothing in this section restricts or precludes 
any investigative right or power given to an agency 
by another statute. 1987 
63-46b-8. Procedures for formal adjudicative 
proceedings — Hearing procedure. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsections 63-46b-3(d)(i) 
and (ii), in all formal adjudicative proceedings, "a 
hearing shall be conducted as follows: 
(a) The presiding officer shall regulate the 
course of the hearing to obtain full disclosure of 
relevant facts and to afford all the parties reason-
able opportunity to present their positions. 
(b) On his own motion or upon objection by a 
party, the presiding officer: 
(i) may exclude evidence that is irrele-
vant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious; 
(ii) shall exclude evidence privileged in 
the courts of Utah; 
(iii) may receive documentary evidence in 
the form of a copy or excerpt if the copy or 
excerpt contains all pertinent portions of the 
original document; 
(iv) may take official notice of any facts 
that could be judicially noticed under the 
Utah Rules of Evidence, of the record of 
other proceedings before the agency, and of 
technical or scientific facts within the 
agency's specialized knowledge. 
(c) The presiding officer may not exclude evi-
dence solely because it is hearsay. 
(d) The presiding officer shall afford to all par-
ties the opportunity to present evidence, argue, 
respond, conduct cross-examination, and submit 
rebuttal evidence. 
(e) The presiding officer may give persons not 
a party to the adjudicative proceeding the oppor-
tunity to present oral or written statements at 
the hearing. 
(f) All testimony presented at the hearing, if 
offered as evidence to be considered in reaching a 
decision on the merits, shall be given under oath. 
(g) The hearing shall be recorded at the 
agency's expense. 
(h) Any party, at his own expense, may have a 
person approved by the agency prepare a tran-
script of the hearing, subject to any restrictions 
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that the agency is permitted by statute to impose 
to protect confidential information disclosed at 
the hearing. 
(i) All hearings shall be open to all parties. 
(2) This section does not preclude the presiding of-
ficer from taking appropriate measures necessary to 
preserve the integrity of the hearing. 1988 
63-46b-9. Procedures for formal adjudicative 
proceedings — Intervention. 
(1) Any person not a party may file a signed, writ-
ten petition to intervene in a formal adjudicative pro-
ceeding with the agency. The person who wishes to 
intervene shall mail a copy of the petition to each 
party. The petition shall include: 
(a) the agency's file number or other reference 
number; 
(b) the name of the proceeding; 
(c) a statement of facts demonstrating that the 
petitioner's legal rights or interests are substan-
tially affected by the formal adjudicative pro-
ceeding, or that the petitioner qualifies as an in-
tervenor under any provision of law; and 
(d) a statement of the relief that the petitioner 
seeks from the agency. 
(2) The presiding officer shall grant a petition for 
intervention if he determines that : 
(a) the petitioner's legal interests may be sub-
stantially affected by the formal adjudicative 
proceeding; and 
(b) the interests of justice and the orderly and 
prompt conduct of the adjudicative proceedings 
will not be materially impaired by allowing the 
intervention. 
(3) (a) Any order granting or denying a petition to 
intervene shall be in writing and sent by mail to 
the petitioner and each party. 
(b) An order permitting intervention may im-
pose conditions on the intervener's participation 
in the adjudicative proceeding that are necessary 
for a just, orderly, and prompt conduct of the ad-
judicative proceeding. 
(c) The presiding officer may impose the condi-
tions at any time after the intervention. 1987 
63-46b-10. Procedures for formal adjudicative 
proceedings — Orders. 
In formal adjudicative proceedings: 
(1) Within a reasonable time after the hear-
ing, or after the filing of any post-hearing papers 
permitted by the presiding officer, or within the 
time required by any applicable statute or rule of 
the agency, the presiding officer shall sign and 
issue an order that includes: 
(a) a statement of the presiding officer's 
findings of fact based exclusively on the evi-
dence of record in the adjudicative proceed-
ings or on facts officially noted; 
(b) a statement of the presiding officer's 
conclusions of law; 
(c) a statement of the reasons for the pre-
siding officer's decision; 
(d) a statement of any relief ordered by 
the agency; 
(e) a notice of the right to apply for recon-
sideration; 
(f) a notice of any right to administrative 
or judicial review of the order available to 
aggrieved parties; and 
(g) the time limits applicable to any recon-
sideration or review. 
(2) The presiding officer may use his experi-
ence, technical competence, and specialized 
knowledge to evaluate the evidence. 
(3) No finding of fact that was contested may 
be based solely on hearsay evidence unless that 
evidence is admissible under the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. 
(4) This section does not preclude the presid-
ing officer from issuing interim orders to: 
(a) notify the parties of further hearings; 
(b) notify the parties of provisional rulings 
on a portion of the issues presented; or 
(c) otherwise provide for the fair and effi-
cient conduct of the adjudicative proceeding. 
1988 
63-46b-l l . Default. 
(1) The presiding officer may enter an order of de-
fault against a party if: 
(a) a party in an informal adjudicative pro-
ceeding fails to participate in the adjudicative 
proceeding; 
(b) a party to a formal adjudicative proceeding 
fails to attend or participate in a properly sched-
uled hearing after receiving proper notice; or 
(c) a respondent in a formal adjudicative pro-
ceeding fails to file a response under Section 
63-46b-6. 
(2) An order of default shall include a statement of 
the grounds for default and shall be mailed to all 
parties. 
(3) (a) A defaulted party may seek to have the 
agency set aside the default order, and any order 
in the adjudicative proceeding issued subsequent 
to the default order, by following the procedures 
outlined in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(b) A motion to set aside a default and any 
subsequent order shall be made to the presiding 
officer. 
(c) A defaulted party may seek agency review 
under Section 63-46b-12, or reconsideration un-
der Section 63-46b-13, only on the decision of the 
presiding officer on the motion to set aside the 
default. 
(4) (a) In an adjudicative proceeding begun by the 
agency, or in an adjudicative proceeding begun 
by a party that has other parties besides the 
party in default, the presiding officer shall, after 
issuing the order of default, conduct any further 
proceedings necessary to complete the adjudica-
tive proceeding without the participation of the 
party in default and shall determine all issues in 
the adjudicative proceeding, including those af-
fecting the defaulting party. 
(b) In an adjudicative proceeding that has no 
parties other than the agency and the party in 
default, the presiding officer shall, after issuing 
the order of default, dismiss the proceeding. 1988 
63-46b-12. Agency review — Procedure. 
(1) (a) If a statute or the agency's rules permit par-
ties to any adjudicative proceeding to seek review 
of an order by the agency or by a superior agency, 
the aggrieved party may file a written request 
for review within 30 days after the issuance of 
the order with the person or entity designated for 
that purpose by the statute or rule, 
(b) The request shall: 
(i) be signed by the party seeking review; 
(ii) state the grounds for review and the 
relief requested; 
(iii) state the date upon which it was 
mailed; and 
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(iv) be sent by mail to the presiding officer 
and to each party. 
(2) Within 15 days of the mailing date of the re-
quest for review, or within the t ime period provided 
by agency rule, whichever is longer, any par ty may 
file a response with the person designated by s ta tu te 
or rule to receive the response. One copy of the re-
sponse shall be sent by mail to each of the part ies and 
to the presiding officer. 
(3) If a s ta tute or the agency's rules require review 
of an order by the agency or a superior agency, the 
agency or superior agency shall review the order 
within a reasonable time or within the t ime required 
by s ta tute or the agency's rules. 
(4) To assist in review, the agency or superior 
agency may by order or rule permit the part ies to file 
briefs or other papers, or to conduct oral argument . 
(5) Notice of hearings on review shall be mailed to 
all parties. 
(6) (a) Within a reasonable t ime after the filing of 
any response, other filings, or oral argument , or 
within the t ime required by s ta tute or applicable 
rules, the agency or superior agency shall issue a 
writ ten order on review. 
(b) The order on review shall be signed by the 
agency head or by a person designated by the 
agency for tha t purpose and shall be mailed to 
each party. 
(c) The order on review shall contain: 
(i) a designation of the s ta tu te or rule per-
mit t ing or requiring review; 
(ii) a s ta tement of the issues reviewed; 
(iii) findings of fact as to each of the issues 
reviewed; 
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the 
issues reviewed; 
(v) the reasons for the disposition; 
(vi) whether the decision of the presiding 
officer or agency is to be affirmed, reversed, 
or modified, and whether all or any portion 
of the adjudicative proceeding is to be re-
manded; 
(vii) a notice of any r ight of further ad-
ministrat ive reconsideration or judicial re-
view available to aggrieved parties; and 
(viii) the t ime limits applicable to any ap-
peal or review. 1988 
63-46b-13. A g e n c y rev iew — Reconsiderat ion. 
(1) (a) Within 20 days after the date tha t an order 
is issued for which review by the agency or by a 
superior agency under Section 63-46b-12 is un-
available, and if the order would otherwise con-
st i tute final agency action, any party may file a 
wri t ten request for reconsideration with the 
agency, s ta t ing the specific grounds upon which 
relief is requested. 
(b) Unless otherwise provided by s ta tu te , the 
filing of the request is not a prerequisite for seek-
ing judicial review of the order. 
(2) The request for reconsideration shall be filed 
with the agency and one copy shall be sent by mail to 
each par ty by the person making the request . 
(3) (a) The agency head, or a person designated for 
that purpose, shall issue a writ ten order grant ing 
the request or denying the request. 
(b) If the agency head or the person designated 
for tha t purpose does not issue an order within 20 
days after the filing of the request, the request 
for reconsideration shall be considered to be de-
nied. 1&88 
63-46b-14. Judicial review — Exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies. 
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of 
final agency action, except in actions where judicial 
review is expressly prohibited by s ta tute . 
(2) A par ty may seek judicial review only after ex-
haust ing all administrat ive remedies available, ex-
cept that : 
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not 
exhaust administrat ive remedies if this chapter 
or any other s ta tu te s tates tha t exhaustion is not 
required; 
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judi-
cial review of the requirement to exhaust any or 
all administrat ive remedies if: 
(i) the administrat ive remedies are inade-
quate; or 
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in 
irreparable h a r m disproportionate to the 
public benefit derived from requir ing ex-
haustion. 
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial re-
view of final agency action within 30 days after 
the date that the order constituting the final 
agency action is issued or is considered to have 
been issued under Subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b). 
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all 
other appropriate parties as respondents and 
shall meet the form requirements specified in 
this chapter. 1988 
63-46b-15. Judicial review — Informal adjudi-
cative proceedings. 
(1) (a) The district courts shall have jurisdiction to 
review by trial de novo all final agency actions 
result ing from informal adjudicative proceed-
ings, except t ha t the juvenile court shall have 
jurisdiction over all s tate agency actions re la t ing 
to removal or placement decisions regarding chil-
dren in state custody. 
(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adju-
dicative proceedings shall be as provided in the 
s ta tu te governing the agency or, in the absence 
of such a venue provision, in the county where 
the petitioner resides or mainta ins his principal 
place of business. 
(2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings shall be a complaint 
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and shall include: 
(i) the name and mailing address of the 
par ty seeking judicial review; 
(ii) the name and mailing address of the 
respondent agency; 
(iii) the t i t le and date of the final agency 
action to be reviewed, together with a dupli-
cate copy, summary, or brief description of 
the agency action; 
(iv) identification of the persons who were 
part ies in the informal adjudicative proceed-
ings tha t led to the agency action; 
(v) a copy of the written agency order from 
the informal proceeding; 
(vi) facts demonstrat ing t h a t the par ty 
.seeking judicial review is entit led to obtain 
judicial review; 
(vii) a request for relief, specifying the 
type and extent of relief requested; 
(viii) a s ta tement of the reasons why the 
petitioner is entitled to relief. 
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(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in 
the district court are governed by the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall de-
termine all questions of fact and law and any 
constitutional issue presented in the pleadings. 
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply in judi-
cial proceedings under this section. 1990 
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or 
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all 
final agency action resulting from formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency ac-
tion resulting from formal adjudicative proceed-
ings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review 
of agency action with the appropriate appellate 
court in the form required by the appellate rules 
of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate ap-
pellate court shall govern all additional filings 
and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the 
agency's record for judicial review of formal adjudica-
tive proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may 
stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the 
record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of pre-
paring transcripts and copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably re-
fuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or 
organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of 
law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on 
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a 
person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on 
which the agency action is based, is unconstitu-
tional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdic-
tion conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues 
requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or 
applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful pro-
cedure or decision-making process, or has failed 
to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were 
illegally constituted as a decision-making body 
or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determi-
nation of fact, made or implied by the agency, 
that is not supported by substantial evidence 
when viewed in light of the whole record before 
the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to 
the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior prac-
tice, unless the agency justifies the inconsis-
tency by giving facts and reasons that dem-
onstrate a fair and rational basis for the in-
consistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 1988 
63-46b-17. Judicial r ev i ew — Type of relief. 
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudica-
tive proceedings by the district court or the re-
view of formal adjudicative proceedings by an ap-
pellate court, the court may award damages or 
compensation only to the extent expressly autho-
rized by statute. 
(b) In granting relief, the court may: 
(i) order agency action required by law; 
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discre-
tion as required by law; 
(iii) set aside or modify agency action; 
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of 
agency action; or 
(v) remand the matter to the agency for 
further proceedings. 
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of 
final agency action are reviewable by a higher court, 
if authorized by statute. 1987 
63-46b-18. Judicial review — Stay and other 
temporary remedies pending final dis-
position. 
(1) Unless precluded by another statute, the 
agency may grant a stay of its order or other tempo-
rary remedy during the pendency of judicial review, 
according to the agency's rules. 
(2) Parties shall petition the agency for a stay or 
other temporary remedies unless extraordinary cir-
cumstances require immediate judicial intervention. 
(3) If the agency denies a stay or denies other tem-
porary remedies requested by a party, the agency's 
order of denial shall be mailed to all parties and shall 
specify the reasons why the stay or other temporary 
remedy was not granted. 
(4) If the agency has denied a stay or other tempo-
rary remedy to protect the public health, safety, or 
welfare against a substantial threat, the court may 
not grant a stay or other temporary remedy unless it 
finds that: 
(a) the agency violated its own rules in deny-
ing the stay; or 
(b) (i) the party seeking judicial review is 
likely to prevail on the merits when the 
court finally disposes of the matter; 
(ii) the party seeking judicial review will 
suffer irreparable injury without immediate 
relief; 
(iii) granting relief to the party seeking 
review will not substantially harm other 
parties to the proceedings; and 
(iv) the threat to the public health, safety, 
or welfare relied upon by the agency is not 
sufficiently serious to justify the agency's ac-
tion under the circumstances. 1987 
63-46b-19. Civil enforcement. 
(1) (a) In addition to other remedies provided by 
law, an agency may seek enforcement of an order 
by seeking civil enforcement in the district 
courts. 
(b) The action seeking civil enforcement of an 
agency's order must name, as defendants, each 
alleged violator against whom the agency seeks 
to obtain civil enforcement. 
(c) Venue for an action seeking civil enforce-
ment of an agency's order shall be determined by 
the requirements of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. 
(d) The action may request, and the court may 
grant, any of the following: 
(i) declaratory relief; 
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(ii) temporary or permanent injunctive re-
lief; 
(iii) any other civil remedy provided by 
law; or 
(iv) any combination of the foregoing. 
(2) (a) Any person whose interests are directly im-
paired or threatened by the failure of an agency 
to enforce an agency's order may timely file a 
complaint seeking civil enforcement of that or-
der, but the action may not be commenced: 
(1) until at least 30 days after the plaintiff 
has given notice of his intent to seek civil 
enforcement of the alleged violation to the 
agency head, the attorney general, and to 
each alleged violator against whom the peti-
tioner seeks civil enforcement; 
(ii) if the agency has filed and is diligently 
prosecuting a complaint seeking civil en-
forcement of the same order against the 
same or a similarly situated defendant; or 
(iii) if a petition for judicial review of the 
same order has been filed and is pending in 
court. 
(b) The complaint seeking civil enforcement of 
an agency's order must name, as defendants, the 
agency whose order is sought to be enforced, the 
agency that is vested with the power to enforce 
the order, and each alleged violator against 
whom the plaintiff seeks civil enforcement. 
(c) Except to the extent expressly authorized 
by statute, a complaint seeking civil enforcement 
of an agency's order may not request, and the 
court may not grant, any monetary payment 
apart from taxable costs. 
(3) In a proceeding for civil enforcement of an 
agency's order, in addition to any other defenses al-
lowed by law, a defendant may defend on the ground 
that: 
(a) the order sought to be enforced was issued 
by an agency without jurisdiction to issue the 
order; 
(b) the order does not apply to the defendant; 
(c) the defendant has not violated the order; or 
(d) the defendant violated the order but has 
subsequently complied. 
(4) Decisions on complaints seeking civil enforce-
ment of an agency's order are reviewable in the same 
manner as other civil cases. 1987 
63-46b-20. Emergency adjudicative proceed-
ings. 
(1) An agency may issue an order on an emergency 
basis without complying with the requirements of 
this chapter if: 
(a) the facts known by the agency or presented 
to the agency show that an immediate and signif-
icant danger to the public health, safety, or wel-
fare exists; and 
(b) the threat requires immediate action by 
the agency. 
(2) In issuing its emergency order, the agency 
shall: 
(a) limit its order to require only the action 
necessary to prevent or avoid the danger to the 
public health, safety, or welfare; 
(b) issue promptly a written order, effective 
immediately, that includes a brief statement of 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and reasons 
for the agency's utilization of emergency adjudi-
cative proceedings; and 
(c) give immediate notice to the persons who 
are required to comply with the order. 
(3) If the emergency order issued under this section 
will result in the continued infringement or impair-
ment of any legal right or interest of any party, the 
agency shall commence a formal adjudicative pro-
ceeding in accordance with the other provisions of 
this chapter. 1987 
63-46b-21. Declaratory orders. 
(1) Any person may file a request for agency ac-
tion, requesting that the agency issue a declaratory 
order determining the applicability of a statute, rule, 
or order within the primary jurisdiction of the agency 
to specified circumstances. 
(2) Each agency shall issue rules that: 
(a) provide for the form, contents, and filing of 
petitions for declaratory orders; 
(b) provide for the disposition of the petitions; 
(c) define the classes of circumstances in which 
the agency will not issue a declaratory order; 
(d) are consistent with the public interest and 
with the general policy of this chapter, and 
(e) facilitate and encourage agency issuance of 
reliable advice. 
(3) (a) An agency may not issue a declaratory or-
der if: 
(i) the request is one of a class of circum-
stances that the agency has by rule defined 
as being exempt from declaratory orders; or 
(ii) the person requesting the declaratory 
order participated in an adjudicative pro-
ceeding concerning the same issue within 12 
months of the date of the present request, 
(b) An agency may issue a declaratory order 
that would substantially prejudice the rights of a 
person who would be a necessary party, only if 
that person consents in writing to the determina-
tion of the matter by a declaratory proceeding. 
(4) Persons may intervene in declaratory proceed-
ings if: 
(a) they meet the requirements of Section 
63-46b-9; and 
(b) they file timely petitions for intervention 
according to agency rules. 
(5) An agency may provide, by rule or order, that 
other provisions of Sections 63-46b-4 through 63-46b-
13 apply to declaratory proceedings. 
(6) (a) After receipt of a petition for a declaratory 
order, the agency may issue a written order: 
(i) declaring the applicability of the stat-
ute, rule, or order in question to the specified 
circumstances; 
(ii) setting the matter for adjudicative pro-
ceedings; 
(iii) agreeing to issue a declaratory order 
within a specified time; or 
(iv) declining to issue a declaratory order 
and stating the reasons for its action. 
(b) A declaratory order shall contain: 
(i) the names of all parties to the proceed-
ing on which it is based; 
(ii) the particular facts on which it is 
based; and 
(iii) the reasons for its conclusion. 
(c) A copy of all orders issued in response to a 
request for a declaratory proceeding shall be 
mailed promptly to the petitioner and any other 
parties. 
(d) A declaratory order has the same status 
and binding effect as any other order issued in an 
adjudicative proceeding. 
(7) Unless the petitioner and the agency agree in 
writing to an extension, if an agency has not issued a 
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declaratory order within 60 days after receipt of the 
petition for a declaratory order, the petition is denied. 
1988 
63-46b-22. Transition procedures. 
(1) The procedures for agency action, agency re-
view, and judicial review contained in this chapter 
are applicable to all agency adjudicative proceedings 
commenced by or before an agency on or after Janu-
ary 1, 1988. 
(2) Statutes and rules governing agency action, 
agency review, and judicial review that are in effect 
on December 31,1987, govern all agency adjudicative 
proceedings commenced by or before an agency on or 
before December 31, 1987, even if those proceedings 
are still pending before an agency or a court on Janu-
ary 1,1988. 1991 
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nations. 
Enactment of bylaws and rules. 
Creation — Purpose. 
There is hereby established the governor's Com-
mission for Women and Families. The purpose of the 
commission shall be to advise and confer with the 
governor and state agencies concerning issues of im-
portance to women and families in Utah and to serve 
as a contact and coordinating group to analyze state 
and local programs to determine whether they ade-
quately serve women and protect the rights of men, 
women, and families. 1990 
63-47-2. M e m b e r s — Appointment — Terms — 
Vacancies. 
The commission shall consist of 19 members to be 
appointed by the governor for terms of four years. 
Current members continue to serve until the expira-
tion of their terms. The governor shall appoint the 
additional four members to serve for four years. Sub-
sequent appointments shall be for terms of four years. 
Vacancies shaU be filled for the balance of the unex-
pired term. Members may serve two consecutive ap-
pointments. 1990 
63-47-3. Qualifications of members. 
Not more than ten members of the commission may 
be from one political party. Members shall be ap-
pointed from persons with a demonstrated record of 
leadership and involvement, and a willingness to 
make a commitment to the furtherance of the pur-
poses of the commission. The commission shall make 
recommendations to the governor concerning ap-
pointment of members. 1990 
63-47-4. Election of chairman — Meetings. 
Commission members shall elect a chairman, and 
may appoint such other officers from its membership 
as is deemed necessary. The commission shall meet in 
regular meetings and may meet at special meetings 
at the request of the chairman or the governor. 1973 
63-47-5. Duties . 
The commission shall take action to carry out the 
following duties: 
(1) confer with and advise the governor and 
heads of various state departments regarding 
discriminatory legislation and practices, and the 
planning of programs of particular concern to 
women and families; 
(2) serve as a clearinghouse for coordination 
and evaluation of programs, services, and legisla-
tion affecting women and families; 
(3) receive and refer complaints concerning al-
leged violation of women's rights and responsibil-
ities and if necessary report such action to the 
governor; 
(4) conduct studies, workshops, or fact-finding 
hearings to develop recommendations for con-
structive action in all areas of interest to women 
and families; 
(5) conduct or participate in educational pro-
grams concerning issues of importance to women 
and families; 
(6) encourage community organizations and 
state and local units of government to institute 
activities designed to meet the needs of women 
and families; 
(7) participate in gaining support of changes 
deemed necessary by developing legislation and 
community education; and 
(8) act as a liaison between the governor and 
national advisory organizations on the status of 
women or families, and represent the governor 
and the state at meetings of such national orga-
nizations. 1990 
63-47-6. Authority to hire staff. 
The commission shall recommend to the governor 
qualified individuals to staffthe commission based on 
available funds in the commission budget and in ac-
cordance with Title 67, Chapter 19, Utah State Per-
sonnel Management Act. 1992 
63-47-7. Authority to accept funds, gifts, and 
donations. 
The commission may receive and accept federal 
funds, private gifts, donations or funds from any 
source. All moneys shall be deposited with the state 
and shall be continuously available to the commis-
sion to carry out the purposes of this act. 1973 
63-47-8. Enactment of by l aws and rules. 
The commission may enact bylaws or other rules 
for its own governance. 1973 
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UADD NO. 92-0393 
EEOC NO. 35C-92-0418 
D E T E R M I N A T I O N 
JURISDICTION 
Under the authority vested in me by the Utah Anti-Discrimination 
Act, of 1965, as amended, and the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act of 1967, as amended, I issue on behalf of this Division, the 
following Determination as to the merits of the subject charge. 
The jurisdictional requirements have been met as required by the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, the Utah 
Anti-Discrimination Act of 1965, as amended. 
SUMMARY OF CHARGE 
On May 6, 1992, Stephen E. Hausknecht, hereinafter Charging Party, 
alleged that Kennecott Corp., hereinafter Respondent, discriminated 
against him based upon his age. 
SUMMARY OF RESPONSE 
The Respondent categorically denies that Charging Party was 
subjected to discrimination as a result of his age. 
SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION 
A. Charging Party's Allegations 
Charging Party asserts that he has been illegally discriminated 
against based upon his age, over 40. 
E x h i b i t ^ 
Charging Party asserts that not having any training regarding 
sexual harassment or what constitutes sexual harassment, and 
without any previous warnings, and having 38 years service with the 
Respondent, he was terminated because he was told he was guilty of 
sexual harassment. 
Charging Party asserts that he is aware of a male employee, under 
the age of 40, who was charged with sexual harassment, who has not 
been terminated, and is still employed by the Respondent. 
Charging Party asserts that less than one month before Charging 
Party was terminated, he received a satisfactory job performance 
review and a $2,300.00 raise. 
Charging Party asserts that he never received any training from 
Respondent regarding what constitutes sexual harassment. Charging 
Party further asserts that at no time was any complaint ever made 
against him, nor did he receive any warnings prior to the time he 
was called in and terminated. Charging Party asserts that at no 
time was there any physical threats or physical overtures. 
Charging Party asserts that the boundaries of sexual harassment is 
not clear cut, and to a large extent reflects changing morays and 
values of our society. 
Charging Party asserts that in regard to the allegation that he 
improperly disposed of Respondent/s property, Charging Party never 
received a formal reprimand, and he was assigned to dispose of such 
property. Charging Party asserts that in regard to the alleged 
unauthorized vacations, such were raised for the first time in 
Respondent's reply letter. Charging Party further asserts that he 
always advised Respondent when he was leaving or planning on taking 
vacation. 
Charging Party asserts that he apologized to his fellow employees 
regarding the water incident. Charging Party further asserts that 
he did take away certain extra medical supplies which had been 
stock piled. However, it is asserted that the employees were left 
with adequate supplies, and Charging Party had gotten approval from 
Mr. Dunford to remove such excess at least three days earlier. 
Charging Party admits that he went with a female employee to look 
at a desk, and told her in a joking manner, "this ought to deserve 
a kiss, but it might constitute or be considered sexual 
harassment." Charging Party admits that on a few occasions he did 
place his arm on the shoulder of a female employee. However, 
Charging Party asserts that he was never told that this was 
improper no did any of the female employees ever tell him to stop. 
Charging Party asserts that in order to constitute sexual 
harassment, such behavior must be unwanted, but without any 
training warnings or complaints, there is no way of knowing if 
Charging Party's behavior was unwanted. 
B. Respondent's Answer to Charging Party's Allegations: 
Respondent contends that Charging Party's age had no impact on 
Respondent's decision to terminate his employment as a result of 
his pervasive and objectionable conduct towards Respondent's female 
employees, and his unsatisfactory performance. 
Respondent contends that it was advised that Charging Party may 
have engaged in conduct described as sexual harassment. Respondent 
further contends that after it conducted a complete and through 
investigation, Respondent determined that in fact Charging Party 
had engaged in conduct which was in violation of Respondent's 
sexual harassment policy. Such harassment, it is contended, 
included: (1) When Charging Party went with a female employee to 
look at a desk in an isolated part of the building in which they 
worked, Charging Party backed her into a corner and requested a 
kiss in exchange for a desk. Charging Party stated lfI guess I 
can't do this or it would be called sexual harassment."; (2) 
Charging Party treating female employees differently regarding 
assistance, supplies and parking, depending on whether or not they 
had been nice to the Charging Party; (3) Some females co-workers 
stated that Charging Party had actually hugged or kissed or 
attempted to hug and kiss female employees in the building they 
worked at; (4) Charging Party would occasionally suggest that he 
ought to receive a hug or a kiss before giving out supplies, and in 
some instances female employees would go together to obtain 
supplies from Charging Party, since they were uncomfortable in 
approaching him alone. 
Respondent contends that Charging Party was not subject to 
disparate treatment. Respondent points out that in early 1991, 
Respondent terminated the employment of a janitor, who was under 
the age of 40, for unsatisfactory performance and for having 
engaged in conduct described as sexual harassment, including making 
advances to other female employees, and cornering a female employee 
in isolated area to ask for a kiss. Furthermore, it is asserted 
that there were also elements in such employee's record considered 
too harmful to place him in any other position. 
Respondent also points out that in November of 1991, a Building 
Services Technician, under the age of 40, engaged in conduct 
described as sexual harassment, in that he on several occasions 
approached one of the female employees whom he supervised, engaged 
in banter of a sexual nature with her, and asked for dates with 
her. Such employee was reprimanded, demoted to the position of a 
janitor, received a substantial pay cut, and was reassigned so as 
to avoid contact with female employees. 
Respondent contends that Charging Party's lack of specific training 
regarding sexual harassment, lack of prior warnings or complaints, 
and his years of service with Respondent are irrelevant to the 
issue of whether or not he was terminated because of his age. 
Respondent contends that Charging Party admitted having seen and 
read Respondent's sexual harassment policy posted on the bulletin 
boards at the Technical Center where he worked. Respondent further 
points out that during one incident when Charging Party backed a 
female employee into a corner in an isolated part of the building 
in which he worked and requested a kiss in exchange for obtaining 
a desk, Charging Party stated "I guess I can't do this or it would 
be called sexual harassment." 
Respondent contends that Charging Party held the position of 
Supervisor Maintenance Services within Security and Administration 
at the time of his discharge. Respondent contends that in 1989, 
Charging Party had been reprimanded for disposing of Respondent's 
property without authorization. Respondent contends that in June 
of 1991, Charging Party was the subject of an internal review 
relating to his work habits, particularly, Charging Party taking a 
vacation without advising Respondent that he would do so. 
Respondent further asserts, that at the same time, Charging Party 
allowed a summer intern to leave, thus leaving the building without 
security or coverage for services. 
It is contended that on March 18, 1992, Respondent received a 
telephone call from an employee at the Technical Center indicating 
that the water to the building had been turned off without notice, 
thus significantly inconveniencing the other employees in the 
building. Respondent located Charging Party and pointed out to him 
that he should have advised the personnel in the building that the 
water would be turned off. It is further contended that Charging 
Party became angered and confronted the employee that had called, 
among others, and told them that he would retaliate by taking away 
the medical supplies, such as band-aids and headache remedies which 
were located in their work areas. Respondent asserts that at that 
point, the employee who had called to report the lack of water, 
reported to Respondent allegations of sexual harassment. 
On March 20, 1992, Charging Party was invited to Respondent's 
headquarters whereupon he was confronted with the allegations, 
wherein Charging Party admitted that he was guilty of hugging and 
kissing Respondent's female employees, and that in connection with 
the desk incident, he had indeed attempted to exact a kiss as 
payment for doing his job. At that interview, it is contended that 
Charging Party admitted that he had read Respondent's policy on 
sexual harassment. Respondent asserts that it thereafter suspended 
Charging Party pending further investigation and was instructed not 
to have any further contact with Kennecott's female employees. 
Respondent contends that it conducted further extensive 
investigation, engaged in extensive internal review, and attempted 
to determine whether Charging Party could be effectively employed 
in another location. Respondent contends that there were no jobs 
requiring Charging Party's skills which could be performed in 
isolation. Therefore, Respondent's contends that its management 
determined that Charging Party's conduct was disruptive of the 
work-place, that it impinged on employee morale, that it caused 
resentment, that it cause inefficiencies in the work-place, that it 
provided a poor example, and that it may be viewed as illegal. 
Respondent asserts that no one has been hired to replace Charging 
Party and Respondent has no intention of replacing him. 
ANALYSIS 
Charging Party has brought this action against Respondent alleging 
violation Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, of 1965, as amended, and 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended. 
A. Prima Facie Case of Age Discrimination 
In order to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination 
Charging Party must allege and prove the following elements: 1) 
that he is a member of a protected class; 2) that he was qualified 
for and was performing her job adequately; 3) that he was subjected 
to an adverse employment decision based upon his age. 
Charging Party is a member of a protected class because he is over 
forty years old. Charging Party was qualified and was performing 
her job adequately with some exceptions. The record indicates that 
a male employee under the age of forty, who was involved in a 
similar type of work as Charging Party, was terminated for engaging 
in similar kinds of sexual harassment as the Charging Party had 
engaged in. The record also indicates that Charging Party was 
aware of and understood the Respondent's sexual harassment policy, 
has admitted putting his arm around female employees, and in at 
least one instance, admitted asking a female employee for a kiss. 
Therefore, Charging Party has failed to establish a prima facie 
case of age discrimination. 
B. Comparison 
Respondent points out that an employee under the age of forty, in 
a similar position as Charging Party, was terminated as a result of 
similar allegations of sexual harassment. 
C. Respondent's Burden 
Although Respondent's burden to articulate a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct is relieved by Charging 
Party's failure to establish a prima facie case of age 
discrimination, Respondent's arguments are set out for 
completeness. 
Respondent contends that Charging Party was terminated as a result 
of his violation of Respondent's sexual harassment policies. 
Respondent contends that Charging Party has admitted to reading 
Respondent's sexual harassment policies. Respondent further 
contends from Charging Party's statement to a female employee after 
he requested a kiss from her that "I guess I can't do this or it 
would be called sexual harassment," implies that Charging Party was 
aware of what constitutes sexual harassment. Furthermore, it is 
contended that Charging Party had attempted to or did hug and/or 
kiss female co-workers. Respondent asserts that Charging Party's 
female co-workers were uncomfortable with being alone with the 
Charging Party. Respondent further contends that Charging Party 
treated his female co-workers differently regarding supplies and 
service, based upon whether or not they were nice to him. 
Respondent points out that in early 1991, Respondent terminated the 
employment of a janitor, who was under the age of 40, for 
unsatisfactory performance and for having engaged in conduct 
described as sexual harassment, including making advance to other 
female employees, and cornering a female employee in isolated an 
area to ask for a kiss. Furthermore, it is asserted that there 
were also elements in such employee's record considered too harmful 
to place him in any other position. 
Respondent also points out that in November of 1991, a Building 
Services Technician, under the age of 40, engaged in conduct 
described as sexual harassment in that he on several occasions 
approached one of the female employees whom he supervised, engaged 
in banter of a sexual nature with her, and asked for dates with 
her. Such employee was reprimanded, demoted to the position of a 
janitor, received a substantial pay cut, and was reassigned so as 
to avoid contact with female employees. 
Respondent asserts that Charging Party's performance was 
unsatisfactory as a result of the following: (1) Charging Party 
disposing of Respondent's property without authorization; (2) 
Charging Party taking a vacation without notifying Respondent; (3) 
Charging Party allowing a co-employee to leave without maintaining 
sufficient support and coverage; (4) Charging Party turning off a 
building's water without first notifying co-workers; and (5) 
Charging Party engaging in sexual harassment of female co-workers. 
Therefore, Respondent has articulated a legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. 
D. Summary 
Charging Party has failed to establish a prima facie case of age 
discrimination. Therefore, the facts in the record, viewed in 
their entirety, indicate that there is NO REASONABLE CAUSE to 
believe that Charging Party was subjected to discriminatory 
practices as alleged. This concludes the Division's informal 
investigative adjudication procedure. 
ON BEHALF OF THE DIVISION, 
Randall Phillips, Investigator Date 
Jay Fowled mrector Date 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIVISION 
UADD Case No. 92-0393 
EEOC No. 35C-92-0418 
STEPHEN E. HAUSKNECHT * 
COMPLAINANT, * 
/s. * O R D E R 
* 
KENNECOTT CORP., a Delaware * 
Corporation, licensed to do * 
Dusiness in the State of Utah * 
RESPONDENT. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
)n November (3^ , 1992, the Anti-Discrimination Division (Division) of the 
Cndustrial Commission of Utah (Commission) issued a determination of "No 
Reasonable Cause" that the Respondent has not violated the Utah Anti-
)iscrimination Act of 1965, Chapter 35, Title 34, Utah Code Annotated, as 
imended, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. 
Ct is hereby ordered that the Charging Party's request for agency action is 
iismissed in the above captioned case. 
If a party wishes to appeal this Order, a written request for a formal 
learing must be filed with the Director of the Division within thirty (30) 
lays from the date of the issuance of this Order as specified in Section 34-
15-7.1(4)(c), U.C.A., and Administrative Rule R560-1-4.A.3 and 4. A request 
'or agency review and a formal hearing will not be considered necessary if 
:he hearing will not add to the evidence in the investigatory file or cause 
:he evidence to be viewed differently. If the Director receives no timely 
•equest for a hearing, this Order becomes the final Order of the Commission 
rith no further rights of appeal as specified in Section 34-35-7.1(4)(d), 
r.C.A. 
LS a party to a complaint filed concurrently under Title VII of the Civil 
lights Act of 1964, as amended, you have the right to request a Substantial 
feight Review by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. If you make 
uch a request, or pursue any other federal action, you will be barred, 
>ursuant to Section 34-35-7.1(16), U.C.A., from commencing or continuing any 
djudicative proceeding regarding this complaint before the Utah Anti-
dscrimination Division. For a request for a Substantial Weight Review to be 
onored, you mst notify the following within fifteen (15) days of the 
ssuance of this Order: 
Antonio DeDios, State & Local Coordinator 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
4520 North Central Avenue, Suite 300, 
Phoenix, Arizona 85012 
ay Fowler/; \ Acting Director Date 
w^> 
Erik Strindberg (Bar No. 4154) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C. 
525 East First South 
Suite 500 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorney for Stephen E. Hausknect 
STATE OF UTAH, INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
LABOR/ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIVISI ON 
STEPHEN E. HAUSKNECT, ] 
Complainant, ] 
vs. ] 
KENNECOTT CORPORATION, \ 
Respondent. 
1 NOTICE OF EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
l UADD No. 92-0393 
Complainant, Stephen E. Hausknect (hereinafter 
"Hausknect") by and through his undersigned attorney, and pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7, 1(5) (c) and Rule 560-1-4 of the Utah 
Administration Code, hereby requests an Evidentiary Hearing on the 
Determination rendered by Randall Phillips and Jay Fowler in this 
matter. That Determination concludes that complainant Hausknect 
has failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination 
and, therefore, there is "no reasonable cause" to believe 
complainant was subjected to discriminatory practices. Complainant 
Hausknect disagrees with this finding and contends that evidence 
produced at a hearing will show not only that he has established a 
Exhibit^ 
prima facie case of age discrimination, but that the respondent 
Kennecott Corporation is unable to show that a legitimate non-
discriminatory business reason existed for his termination. 
Specific grounds for this Evidentiary Hearing are as 
follows: 
1. An Evidentiary Hearing is necessary so that an 
adequate and complete investigation can be done. The investigator 
concluded that the evidence did not establish a prima facie case of 
age discrimination. However, evidence readily available to the 
investigator would establish that: 
a. Complainant was a member of the protected 
group; 
b. He was discharged; 
c. He was qualified to do the job (having 
received a favorable rating twenty (20) days 
before his discharge); 
d. The work that he performed is now being 
performed by an outside contractor and by 
certain college-age students. 
It is obvious from the investigator' s failure to uncover this 
evidence that a hearing is needed so that basic evidence can be 
collected and examined; 
2 
2. An Evidentiary Hearing is also necessary so that 
testimony can be taken from not only the complainant, but from the 
other employees who were involved in the termination decision and 
surrounding facts. The determination of the investigator was made 
solely on the basis of written statements prepared by legal 
counsel. No affidavits were collected nor interviews conducted by 
the investigator. Rule 560-l-4(A)(4) states that "in most cases, 
the need to cross-examine the individuals who have submitted 
affidavits supportive of the initial findings or determination of 
the Commission will be considered a valid reason for granting a 
request for a hearing . . . M Here a hearing is needed so that 
crucial evidentiary testimony can be collected in the first place; 
3. The investigator' s decision appears to be based 
largely upon the fact that Kennecott, at one time, had also 
terminated an individual under the age of forty (40), who had been 
accused of sexual harassment. However, this analysis ignores two 
crucial facts: First, as the investigator acknowledged, that other 
individual' s work performance was unsatisfactory. This is not the 
case with the complainant, who had been successfully employed by 
Kennecott for over thirty-eight (38) years. Secondly, the 
investigator ignores, or brushes aside, the fact that another 
employee under the age of forty (40) was accused of sexual 
harassment was not fired, but merely transferred. An Evidentiary 
3 
Hearing is necessary so that evidence can be produced and explored 
which examines why Mr. Hausknect, a long-time valuable employee was 
treated differently than this younger much less senior employee/ 
and not given the opportunity to transfer. 
4. Evidence was presented in complainant' s charge that 
his termination was motivated by Kennecott' s desire to reduce staff 
in the facility in which the complainant worked prior to closing it 
down. By doing so, Kennecott would not have to pay significant 
severance benefits to the complainant. This issue was not 
investigated at all by the investigator. A hearing would 
facilitate the development of this evidence, including providing 
crucial information on Kennecott' s policies regarding lay-offs, 
benefits and severance pay; 
5. A hearing is also necessary to produce evidence 
regarding Kennecott' s training policy. Kennecott, and the 
investigator relied heavily on Kennecott' s claim that complainant 
knew or should have known that his conduct amounted to sexual 
harassment. There is no supporting documentation or testimony in 
the form of affidavits to support Kennecott' s contention that 
complainant received any training or counseling in this area. An 
Evidentiary Hearing would allow evidence to be presented on this 
very important issue; 
4 
6. Lastly/ an Evidentiary Hearing is needed to 
adequately investigate the alleged basis for Hausknect' s 
termination (i.e. - that he harassed a certain female employees)• 
No affidavits or documentary evidence taken or examined by the 
investigator to support or disprove this key issue (i.e. - that 
there was a legitimate reason for complainant's discharge). An 
Evidentiary Hearing is necessary so that evidence and testimony can 
be taken on this issue as well. 
For these reasons, complainant requests that an 
Evidentiary Hearing in this matter be held and that the initial 
determination of the investigator not become the final Order of the 
Commission. 
DATED this '* day of December, 1992. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C. 
Erik Strindberg ~7 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was hand-delivered, on this J^S day of December/ 
1992, to the following: 
James M. Elegante 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-08989 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
160 East 3 00 South, 3d Floor 
P.O. Box 146615 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-6615 
Stephen E. Hausknecht, 
Charging Party, 
vs. 
Kennecott Corp., 
Respondent. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
ORDER 
GRANTING 
FORMAL 
PROCEEDING 
UADD NO. 92-0393 
NO. 35C-92-0418 (ADEA) 
********************************* 
The request for an evidentiary hearing in the above 
entitled matter to review de novo the Determination and Order of 
the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division having been considered, and 
it having been determined that the CHARGING PARTY has met the 
requirements of law and does: 
Show that a hearing will add to the evidence in 
the investigatory file, or show that the evidence in the 
file may be viewed differently by the hearing, 
And it appearing that the foregoing constitutes good 
cause for the request, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the request of the 
CHARGING PARTY be, and the same is hereby, granted. 
/Q*—^<SdL ^ _ 
Timothy C. Allen,, 
Presiding Administrative Law Judge 
Certified by the Industrial Commission of 
Utah this /^T^day of ~~)T?€OurA.^ 1993. 
Patricia O. Ashby, Commissio$>-Secreta 
Exhibits 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on March , 1993, a copy of the 
attached Order Granting Formal Proceeding, in the UADD case of 
Stephen E. Hausknecht vs. Kennecott Corporation, was mailed to the 
following persons at the following addresses, postage paid: 
Stephen E. Hausknecht 
2158 Terra Linda Drive 
SLC, UT 84041 
Erik Strindberg, 
Attorney at Law 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
P O Box 11008 
SLC, UT 84147-0008 
James M. Elegante 
Attorney at Law 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
P. O. Box 11898 
SLC, UT 84147-0898 
Anna R. Jensen 
Director 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
UADD Division 
160 East 300 South 
SLC, UT 84114-6630 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
By (KX it\nr^i 9D\KN\^L^/ 
Wilma Burrows 
Adjudication Division 
\ ^ 
James M. Elegante (0968) 
of and for 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Respondent 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
STATE OF UTAH, INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
LABOR/ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIVISION 
* * * * * * * * 
S t e v e n E. H a u s k n e c h t ) 
) RESPONSE TO COMPLAINANT'S 
C o m p l a i n a n t , ) REQUEST FOR AN EVIDENTIARY 
) HEARING 
v s . ) 
Kennecott Corporation, ) Civil No. 92-0393 
Respondent. ) 
* * * * * * * * 
Respondent Kennecott Corporation, ("Kennecott") , by and 
through counsel and pursuant to § 63-46b-12 (2) , Utah Code Ann., 
hereby submits its Response to Complainant's Request for an 
Evidentiary Hearing ("Request"). 
Mr. Hausknecht sets forth six arguments in support of 
his Request; however, as the following discussion illustrates, 
none of those arguments provides a basis to warrant a hearing in 
this case. 
Mr. Hausknecht's first argument is that "[a]n 
evidentiary hearing is necessary so that an adequate and complete 
Exhibit^ 
investigation can be done" and "basic evidence can be collected 
and examined-" Request at 2. This argument fails for the fol-
lowing three reasons. 
First, the purpose of a hearing is to give the Commis-
sion the chance to "review de novo the Director's Determination." 
Utah Admin. R. 560-1-4 (3). The purpose of a hearing is not to 
conduct an investigation or collect evidence. That goal is 
accomplished by the Industrial Commission Investigator assigned 
to the case. In other words, the fact finding phase of this case 
is over. A thorough and complete investigation took place and 
there were no deficiencies in the investigation. 
Second, Mr. Hausknecht suggests that he failed to 
introduce the evidence at the investigation stage necessary to 
support his claim of discrimination. However, an adequate and 
complete investigation was conducted by Randall Phillips, the 
Industrial Commission Investigator who handled this claim (the 
"investigator") , and extensive evidence was collected and exam-
ined. In the five months between the date this claim was filed 
and the date the Industrial Commission issued its determination, 
the following evidence was collected by the investigator: (1) 
Kennecott's 10 page response which included detailed and complete 
answers to a lengthy set of investigative questions, a general 
statement, a copy of Kennecott's sexual harassment policy, and 58 
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pages of deta i led notes re lated to Kennecott's inves t iga t ion of 
Mr. Hausknecht's conduct; (2) Mr. Hausknecht's reply to Kenne-
c o t t ' s response; and (3) Kennecott's de ta i l ed response to Mr. 
Hausknecht's reply l e t t e r . In short , the r e a l i t y in t h i s case i s 
tha t more than j u s t "basic evidence" has been c o l l e c t e d and exam-
ined. Indeed, extensive evidence has been submitted into the 
record. The invest igator care fu l ly considered t h i s evidence in 
making h i s determination. See "SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION" sec t ion 
of the Determination. Therefore, Mr. Hausknecht's f i r s t argument 
i s specious at bes t . In fac t , Mr. Hausknecht in essence admits 
t h a t in t h i s case an adequate inves t iga t ion has already been con-
ducted and that the necessary evidence has been submitted when he 
s t a t e s that evidence related t o the i s sues which he claims must 
be inves t igated i s "readily ava i lab le to the inves t i ga tor ." 
Request at 2. 
Third, Mr. Hausknecht had ample opportunity to submit 
evidence at the inves t igat ion s tage . Nevertheless , Mr. 
Hausknecht submitted only arguments; he f a i l e d to submit any 
1
 This evidence showed inter a l i a : (1) Mr. Hausknecht's age had nothing 
to do with Kennecott's decis ion to terminate h i s employment; (2) Kennecott 
terminated Mr. Hausknecht's employment because he engaged in conduct described 
as pervasive sexual harassment and because his performance was unsatisfactory; 
and (3) Mr. Hausknecht was not subject to disparate treatment ( in 1991, 
Kennecott terminated the employment of a jani tor who was under 40 years old 
for engaging in sexual harassment and whose performance was unsat i s factory) . 
See Kennecott's June 10, 1992, Response; Kennecott's August 20, 1992 Response; 
November 20, 1992, Determination. 
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facts which would give the investigator a basis to rule in his 
favor. It was not through inadvertence that Mr. Hausknecht 
failed to submit any factual evidence to support his claims; the 
reality is that his claim is groundless. 
Therefore, Mr. Hausknecht's first argument fails to 
warrant a hearing in this case. 
Mr. Hausknecht's second argument is based on Utah 
Admin. R. 560-1-4(A)(4), which provides: "In most cases, the 
need to cross-examine the individuals who have submitted affida-
vits supportive of the initial finding or determination of the 
Commission will be considered a valid reason for granting a 
request for a hearing by the Commission." (Emphasis added). Mr. 
Hausknecht argues that "a hearing is needed so that crucial 
evidentiary testimony can be taken in the first place." Request 
at 3. This argument fails for the following three reasons. 
First, the purpose of a hearing is not to collect evi-
dence. See discussion above at 2. 
Second, this rule is specifically limited to cases 
where there is a need to cross-examine "the individuals who have 
submitted affidavits supportive of the initial finding or deter-
mination." Utah Admin. R. 560-1-4 (A) (4) . In the instant case, 
as Mr. Hausknecht admits at page 3 of his Request, no such indi-
viduals or affidavits exist. In this case there is no allegation 
-4-
and certainly no proof that evidence was in any way suppressed. 
The investigator gave Mr. Hausknecht ample opportunity to present 
any evidence which he wished in connection with this charge. 
Furthermore, in this case there were no affidavits and 
counter-affidavits so that the veracity of a witness would have 
to be determined by a fact finder. The reality is that com-
pletely unsubstantiated allegations were made by the charging 
party and that the responding party replied with concrete evi-
dence to substantiate the reason for the termination of employ-
ment. Therefore, there is no need for the cross-examination con-
templated by this rule. 
Third, during the investigation phase, Mr. Hausknecht 
had every opportunity to submit any evidence to support his claim 
of discrimination, including affidavits. Nevertheless, he chose 
2 
not to do so. Mr. Hausknecht's complaint that affidavits were 
not collected by the investigator does not advance his argument. 
If Mr. Hausknecht felt that affidavits were necessary, it was his 
duty to submit them into the record. It is not the duty of the 
* That Mr. Hausknecht would not support his claim with the affidavits of 
others is not surprising: His coworkers, mostly females, were the victims of 
his sexual misbehavior, so they could hardly be expected to provide support 
for his claim. There are no other current or former workers similarly situ-
ated to support his specious claim. 
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investigator to go out and obtain affidavits in support of Mr. 
Hausknecht's claim. 
Therefore, Mr. Hausknecht's second argument fails to 
warrant a hearing in this case. 
In his third argument, Mr. Hausknecht asserts that a 
hearing is necessary so that evidence can be produced and 
explored which examines why he was treated differently than a 
younger employee who was the subject of a transfer as a result of 
his sexually oriented misbehavior. Request at 3. This assertion 
is premised on Mr. Hausknecht's claim that his work performance 
was not unsatisfactory. Mr. Hausknecht's third argument fails 
for the following four reasons. 
First, the purpose of a hearing is not to produce new 
evidence. See discussion above at 2. 
Second, Mr. Hausknect's sexually-oriented conduct was 
pervasive. Kennecott's internal investigation showed that his 
conduct was more egregious than the conduct of the employee whose 
employment was terminated and much more egregious than the con-
duct of the employee who was reprimanded and transferred to 
another job. His sexually-oriented activities in and of them-
selves provided a sufficient basis to terminate his employment. 
The argument, based on a claim that Mr. Hausknecht,s work perfor-
mance was not unsatisfactory, is completely contrary to the 
-6-
f a c t s . However, in addit ion t o h i s object ionable sexual behav-
ior , Mr, Hausknect's job performance was not sa t i s fac tory t o 
Kennecott . 3 See Kennecott's June 10, 1992, Response; Determina-
t i o n . Therefore, the i s s u e i s whether Kennecott treated Mr. 
Hausknecht d i f f e r e n t l y than a younger employee who, l i k e Mr. 
Hausknecht, had engaged in sexual harassment and whose work was 
unsa t i s fac tory . The evidence shows that Kennecott terminated the 
employment of a j a n i t o r , who i s under the age of 40, because he 
engaged in sexual ly oriented behavior which was unacceptable and 
because h i s work performance was unsat i s fac tory . Id. Kenne-
c o t t # s treatment of an employee who had engaged in s imilar behav-
i o r but whose job performance allowed Kennecott to transfer him 
t o another job has l i t t l e re levance to t h i s case , and a hearing 
i s not necessary t o produce and explore evidence related t o that 
treatment. 
•* The determinative i ssue in t h i s case i s whether Kennecott" s motivation 
for terminating Mr. Hausknecht's employment was discriminatory, i . e . , whether 
Kennecott terminated Mr. Hausknecht's employment because he i s over 40 years 
of age. Whether Kennecott ac tua l ly had good cause to terminate Mr. 
Hausknecht's employment i s not an i s s u e . In other words, the correctness or 
v a l i d i t y of Kennecott's proffered reasons for terminating Mr. Hausknecht's 
employment i s i rre levant . Therefore, whether Hausknecht was actual ly g u i l t y 
of sexual ly unacceptable behavior and unsat i s factory job performance i s i r r e l -
evant so long as Kennecott be l i eved he was g u i l t y of these things . The 
d i s p o s i t i v e point i s that Kennecott terminated Mr. Hausknecht's employment for 
reasons (whether based in actual fac t or not) other than h i s age. 
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Third, evidence related to Kennecott's decision to ter-
minate Mr. Hausknecht's employment rather than transferring him 
has already been produced. See Kennecott's June 10, 1992, 
Response. That evidence shows that Kennecott determined that Mr. 
Hausknecht's activities and long-standing propensity to exact 
special favors from female employees provided a sufficient basis 
in and of itself to terminate his employment. 
Fourth and finally, Mr. Hausknecht had ample opportu-
nity at the investigation stage to submit evidence, rather than 
mere argument, related to this issue and his claim of pretext, 
4 
but he failed to do so. 
Therefore, Mr. Hausknecht's third argument fails to 
warrant a hearing in this case. 
Mr. Hausknecht's fourth argument is that a hearing is 
necessary to facilitate the development of evidence related to 
his allegation that Kennecott terminated his employment to avoid 
having to pay him severance benefits. Request at 4. This argu-
ment fails because: (1) the purpose of a hearing is not to pro-
duce new evidence, see discussion above at 2; (2) the information 
contained in the disclosures made by Kennecott to the investiga-
tor demonstrate precisely the basis upon which Kennecott 
See footnote 2, supra. 
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terminated the employment of Mr. Hausknecht; and (3) Mr. 
Hausknecht had ample opportunity to submit evidence to support 
his claim relevant to this issue at the investigation stage, but 
he failed to do so. The reality is that no evidence was pre-
sented by the charging party that his termination was motivated 
by Kennecott's desire to reduce staff and to save severance bene-
fits. In fact, this issue did not appear as part of the charge 
but was merely an argument raised by the charging party in his 
July 22, 1992, reply statement at page 1. Indeed the extent of 
the "evidence" offered was nothing more than a bald suggestion of 
Kennecott's motivation. The facts in the case completely refuted 
the suggestion and the charging party did not substantiate the 
claim in any way. 
Mr. Hausknecht's fifth argument is that a hearing is 
necessary to produce evidence related to Kennecott's sexual 
harassment policy and his knowledge of it. Request at 4. This 
argument fails because: (1) the purpose of a hearing is not to 
produce new evidence, see discussion above at 2; (2) it is irrel-
evant whether Mr. Hausknecht was actually guilty of sexual 
5 harassment, see discussion above at n. 3; (3) evidence related 
-> It is simply incredible that in the face of his admissions that he was 
guilty of hugging and kissing Kennecott's female employees and that in connec-
tion with his employment he attempted to extract a kiss as payment for doing 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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to this issue, including a copy of the policy, was submitted dur-
ing the investigation, see Kennecott's June 10, 1992, Response; 
and (4) Mr- Hausknecht had ample opportunity to submit evidence 
related to this issue at the investigation stage, but he failed 
to do so, 
Mr- Hausknecht's sixth and final argument is that a 
hearing is needed to investigate and take evidence and testimony 
related to one of the alleged bases (sexual harassment) for the 
termination of his employment- Request at 5. This argument 
fails because: (1) the purpose of a hearing is not to investi-
gate and produce new evidence, see discussion above at 2; (2) it 
is irrelevant whether Mr. Hausknecht was actually guilty of sex-
ual harassment, see discussion above at n. 3; (3) extensive and 
detailed evidence related to the issue of Mr. Hausknecht's sexual 
naughtiness, including 58 pages of notes from Kennecott's inves-
tigation, were submitted at the investigation stage, see Kenne-
cott's June 10, 1992, Response; and (4) Mr. Hausknecht had ample 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
his job, Mr. Hausknecht would now urge the Commission to hold a hearing to 
gather "crucial evidentiary testimony." 
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opportunity to submit evidence related to this issue at the 
investigation stage, but he did not do so. 
In sum, none of Mr. Hausknecht/s arguments provides a 
basis for the Commission to set this case for a hearing. The 
Request should be denied. 
DATED this V ^ d a y of January, 1993. 
^AMES M. fej^EGAN1 
—*"^ ^ of and for 
EGANTE 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Kennecott Corporation 
° One wonders whether at such a hearing Mr. Hausknecht would attempt now 
to deny that he engaged in h i s objectionable behavior or whether more evidence 
of unacceptable behavior would surface. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONSE TO 
COMPLAINANT'S REQUEST FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING to the following 
on this day of January, 1993: 
Erik Strindberg 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
525 East 100 South, #500 
P.O. BOX 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-008 
Jay Fowler 
Acting Director 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
Antidiscrimination Division 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. BOX 146640 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6640 
Stephen Hadley, Chairman 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 146640 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6640 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
160 East 3 00 South, 3d Floor 
O. Box 146615 
--..SALT LA#£ CITY, UTAH 84114-6615 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
ORDER 
SETTING ASIDE 
GRANT OF FORMAL 
PROCEEDING 
UADD No. 92-0393 
Steven E. Hausknecht, 
larging Party, 
Kennecott Corporation, 
Respondent. * 
********************************* 
The request for an evidentiary hearing in the above 
entitled matter to review de novo the Determination and Order of 
the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division having been considered, and 
an Order Granting Formal Proceeding having been issued on March 15, 
1993, and further, it having been discovered upon motion by the 
respondent that respondent's document captioned Response To 
Complainant's Request For An Evidentiary Hearing was not in the 
file at the time of consideration of the Order Granting Formal 
Proceeding, the Order Granting Formal Proceeding dated March 15, 
1993 is hereby set aside, and the charging party's request as well 
as the respondent's response will be considered, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the request of the 
RESPONDENT be, and the same is hereby granted and the Order 
Granting Formal Proceeding is set aside for further consideration. 
^ _ _ ^ _ 
Timothy C. Allen 
Presiding Administrative Law Judge 
/^^A^^^ ZS2^_ 
Certified by the Industrial Commission of 
Utah this AT^day of'"/T^ r^vZ^  1993. 
ATTEST: C 
•Wfe ,r> co 
Patricia O. Ashb ssion Secretary 
Exhibits 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on March \^\ , 1993, a copy of the 
attached Order Setting Aside Grant of Formal Proceeding, in the 
UADD case of Stephen E. Hausknecht vs. Kennecott Corporation, was 
mailed to the following persons at the following addresses, postage 
paid: 
Stephen E. Hausknecht 
2158 Terra Linda Drive 
SLC, UT 84041 
Erik Strindberg' 
Attorney at Law 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
P O Box 11008 
SLC, UT 84147-0008 
James M. Elegante 
Attorney at Law 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
P. O. Box 11898 
SLC, UT 84147-0898 
Anna R. Jensen 
Director 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
UADD Division 
160 East 300 South 
SLC, UT 84114-6630 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Wilma Burrows 
Adjudication Division 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 146615 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-6615 
J\\^ 
\°\3 
/''Steven E. Hausknechl 
Charging Party, 
Kennecott Corporation, 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
ORDER GRANTING 
FORMAL HEARING 
UPON FURTHER REVIEW 
UADD NO. 92-0393 
EEOC No. 35C-92-0418 
Respondent. 
********************************* 
The request for an evidentiary hearing, as well as the 
response of the respondent, in the above entitled matter to review 
de novo the Determination and Order of the Utah Anti-Discrimination 
Division having been duly considered, and it having been determined 
that the CHARGING PARTY has met the requirements of law and does: 
Show that a hearing will add to the evidence in 
the investigatory file, or show that the evidence in the 
file may be viewed differently by the hearing, 
And it appearing that the foregoing constitutes good 
cause for the request, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the request of the 
CHARGING PARTY be, and the same is hereby, granted. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review or 
specific written objection hereto must be filed with the Commission 
within thirty (30) days from the date of this Order, or it shall be 
the final Order of the Commission, not subject to further review or 
appeal. A Motion for Review must be signed by the party seeking 
review; state the grounds for review and the relief requested; 
state the date upon which it was mailed; and be sent by mail to the 
undersigned, and to each party. 
OJM^ 
len 
ministrative Law Judge 
Certified by the Industrial Commission of 
Utah this^ ?/. ^ day of ' h^.P 1993. 
ATTEST: .jr^y 
^-J/^D C M 
Patricia 0. Ashbyi Commission Secretary  
E x h i b i t ^ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on AprilrQCp"^ , 1993, a copy of the 
attached Order Granting Formal Hearing Upon Further Review, in the 
UADD case of Stephen E. Hausknecht vs. Kennecott Corporation, was 
mailed to the following persons at the following addresses, postage 
paid: 
Stephen E^ Hausknecht 
2158 Terra Linda Drive 
SLC, UT 84041 
Erik Strindberg 
Attorney at Law 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
P O Box 11008 
SLC, UT 84147-0008 
James M. Elegante 
Attorney at Law 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
P. O. Box 11898 
SLC, UT 84147-0898 
Anna R. Jensen 
Director 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
UADD Division 
160 East 300 South 
SLC, UT 84114-6630 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Byj .KJ±WV>& Qpth'xA p \QrJVy\ 
Wilma Burrows 
Adjudication D iv i s i on 
James M. Elegante (0968) 
of and for 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Respondent 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
STATE OF UTAH, INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
LABOR/ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIVISION 
* * * * * * * * 
Steven E. Hausknecht ) 
) MOTION FOR REVIEW 
Complainant, ) 
vs. ) 
Kennecott Corporation, ) UADD No. 92-0393 
Respondent. ) EEOC No. 35C-92-0418 
* * * * * * * * 
Respondent Kennecott Corporation, ("Kennecott"), by and 
through its attorneys and pursuant to § 63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann., 
hereby moves the Industrial Commission to review the correctness of 
the Order Granting Formal Hearing Upon Further Review ("Order") 
issued April 26, 1993, grant the charging party a formal hearing. 
This Motion for Review is brought on the grounds that the Order 
does not comply with the requirements of Utah law for granting a 
formal hearing from a determination and order entered by the Anti-
Discrimination Division. Specifically, the Order fails to specify 
the basis upon which it is granted and the record does not support 
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ExhibitH 
the grant of a formal hearing. 
GROUNDS FOR REVIEW 
Mr. Hausknecht set forth six arguments in support of his 
Request for an Evidentiary Hearing ("Request"). None of those 
arguments provided a basis to warrant a hearing in this case. 
Mr. Hausknecht's first argument was that M[a]n 
evidentiary hearing is necessary so that an adequate and complete 
investigation can be done" and "basic evidence can be collected and 
examined." Request at 2. This argument provided no basis for the 
Order for the following reasons. 
First, the purpose of a hearing is to give the Commission 
the chance to "review de novo the Directors Determination." Utah 
Admin. R. 560-1-4 (3). The purpose of a hearing is not to conduct 
an investigation or collect evidence. That goal is accomplished by 
the Industrial Commission Investigator assigned to the case. The 
fact finding phase of this case is over. A thorough and complete 
investigation took place and there were no deficiencies in the 
investigation. 
Second, Mr. Hausknecht suggested that he failed to 
introduce the evidence at the investigation stage necessary to 
support his claim of discrimination. However, an adequate and 
complete investigation was conducted by Randall Phillips, the 
Industrial Commission Investigator who handled this claim (the 
"investigator"), and extensive evidence was collected and examined. 
In the five months between the date this claim was filed and the 
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date the Division issued its determination, the following evidence 
was collected by the investigator: (1) Kennecott's 10 page 
response which included detailed and complete answers to a lengthy 
set of investigative questions, a general statement, a copy of 
Kennecott's sexual harassment policy, and 58 pages of detailed 
notes related to Kennecott's investigation of Mr. Hausknecht's 
conduct; (2) Mr. Hausknecht's reply to Kennecott's response; and 
(3) Kennecott's detailed response to Mr. Hausknecht's reply letter. 
Thus, more than just "basic evidence" was collected and examined by 
the Division. Indeed, extensive evidence was submitted into the 
record.1 The investigator considered this evidence in making his 
determination. See "SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION" section of the 
Determination. Mr. Hausknecht's first argument was specious at 
best and in fact, Mr. Hausknecht in essence admitted that in this 
case an adequate investigation was conducted and that the necessary 
evidence was submitted, when he stated that evidence related to the 
issues which he claimed must be investigated was "readily available 
to the investigator." Request at 2. 
Third, Mr. Hausknecht had ample opportunity to submit 
1
 This evidence showed inter alia: (1) Mr. Hausknecht's age had nothing to do with 
Kennecott's decision to terminate his employment; (2) Kennecott terminated Mr. 
Hausknecht's employment because he engaged in conduct described as pervasive sexual 
harassment and because his performance was unsatisfactory; and (3) Mr. Hausknecht was 
not subject to disparate treatment (in 1991, Kennecott terminated the employment of a 
janitor who was under 40 years old for engaging in sexual harassment and whose 
performance was unsatisfactory). See Kennecott's June 10, 1992, Response; Kennecott's 
August 20, 1992 Response; November 20, 1992, Determination. 
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evidence at the investigation stage. Nevertheless, Mr. Hausknecht 
submitted only arguments; he failed to submit any facts which 
would give the investigator a basis to rule in his favor. It was 
not through inadvertence that Mr. Hausknecht failed to submit any 
factual evidence to support his claims; the reality is that his 
claim is groundless. 
Therefore, Mr. Hausknecht's first argument failed to 
provide a basis to warrant a hearing in this case as ordered by the 
Administrative Law Judge. 
Mr. Hausknecht's second argument was based on Utah Admin. 
R. 560-1-4 (A) (4) , which provides: "In most cases, the need to 
cross-examine the individuals who have submitted affidavits 
supportive of the initial finding or determination of the 
Commission will be considered a valid reason for granting a request 
for a hearing by the Commission." (Emphasis added). Mr. 
Hausknecht argued in the Request that "a hearing is needed so that 
crucial evidentiary testimony can be taken in the first place." 
Request at 3. This argument similarly provided no basis for the 
Order for the following reasons. 
First, the purpose of a hearing is not to collect evi-
dence. See discussion above at 2. 
Second, this rule is specifically limited to cases where 
there is a need to cross-examine "the individuals who have 
submitted affidavits supportive of the initial finding or deter-
mination." Utah Admin. R. 560-1-4(A)(4). In the instant case, as 
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Mr. Hausknecht admitted at page 3 of his Request, no such indi-
viduals or affidavits exist. In this case there is no allegation 
and certainly no proof that evidence was in any way suppressed. 
The investigator gave Mr. Hausknecht ample opportunity to present 
any evidence which he wished in connection with this charge. 
Furthermore, in this case there were no affidavits and counter-
affidavits so that the veracity of a witness would have to be 
determined by a fact finder. The reality is that completely 
unsubstantiated allegations were made by the charging party and 
that the responding party replied with concrete evidence to 
substantiate the reason for the termination of employment. 
Therefore, there is no need for the cross-examination contemplated 
by this rule. 
Third, during the investigation phase, Mr. Hausknecht 
had every opportunity to submit any evidence to support his claim 
of discrimination, including affidavits. Nevertheless, he chose 
not to do so.2 Mr. Hausknecht's complaint that affidavits were not 
collected by the investigator does not advance his argument. If 
Mr. Hausknecht felt that affidavits were necessary, it was his duty 
to submit them into the record. It is not the duty of the 
investigator to go out and obtain affidavits in support of Mr. 
2
 That Mr. Hausknecht would not support his claim with the affidavits of others is 
not surprising: His coworkers, mostly females, were the victims of his sexual misbehavior, 
so they could hardly be expected to provide support for his claim. There are no other 
current or former workers similarly situated to support his specious claim. 
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Hausknecht's claim. 
Therefore, Mr. Hausknecht's second argument failed to 
warrant a hearing in this case as ordered by the Administrative Law 
Judge• 
In his third argument, Mr. Hausknecht asserted that a 
hearing is necessary so that evidence can be produced and explored 
which examines why he was treated differently than a younger 
employee who was the subject of a transfer as a result of his 
sexually oriented misbehavior. Request at 3. This assertion is 
premised on Mr. Hausknecht's claim that his work performance was 
not unsatisfactory. Mr. Hausknecht's third argument likewise 
provided no basis for the Order for the following reasons. 
First, the purpose of a hearing is not to produce new 
evidence. See discussion above at 2. 
Second, Mr. Hausknecht/s sexually-oriented conduct was 
pervasive. Kennecott's internal investigation showed that his 
conduct was more egregious than the conduct of the employee whose 
employment was terminated and much more egregious than the conduct 
of the employee who was reprimanded and transferred to another job. 
His sexually-oriented activities in and of themselves provided a 
sufficient basis to terminate his employment. The argument, based 
on a claim that Mr. Hausknecht's work performance was not 
unsatisfactory, is completely contrary to the facts. However, in 
addition to his objectionable sexual behavior, Mr. Hausknecht's job 
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performance was not satisfactory to Kennecott.3 See Kennecott's 
June 10, 1992, Response; Determination. Therefore, the issue is 
whether Kennecott treated Mr. Hausknecht differently than a younger 
employee who, like Mr. Hausknecht, had engaged in sexual harassment 
and whose work was unsatisfactory. The evidence shows that 
Kennecott terminated the employment of a janitor, who is under the 
age of 40, because he engaged in sexually oriented behavior which 
was unacceptable and because his work performance was 
unsatisfactory. Id. Kennecott's treatment of an employee who had 
engaged in similar behavior but whose job performance allowed 
Kennecott to transfer him to another job has little relevance to 
this case, and a hearing is not necessary to produce and explore 
evidence related to that treatment. 
Third, evidence related to Kennecott's decision to ter-
minate Mr. Hausknecht'& employment rather than transferring him has 
already been produced. See Kennecott's June 10, 1992, Response. 
That evidence shows that Kennecott determined that Mr. Hausknecht's 
3
 The determinative issue in this case is whether Kennecott's motivation for 
terminating Mr. Hausknecht's employment was discriminatory, i.e., whether Kennecott 
terminated Mr. Hausknecht's employment because he is over 40 years of age. Whether 
Kennecott actually had good cause to terminate Mr. Hausknecht's employment is not an 
issue. In other words, the correctness or validity of Kennecott's proffered reasons for 
terminating Mr. Hausknecht's employment is irrelevant. Therefore, whether Hausknecht 
was actually guilty of sexually unacceptable behavior and unsatisfactory job performance is 
irrelevant so long as Kennecott believed he was guilty of these things. The dispositive point 
is that Kennecott terminated Mr. Hausknecht's employment for reasons (whether based in 
actual fact or not) other than his age. 
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activities and long-standing propensity to exact special favors 
from female employees provided a sufficient basis in and of itself 
to terminate his employment. 
Fourth and finally, Mr. Hausknecht had ample opportunity 
at the investigation stage to submit evidence, rather than mere 
argument, related to this issue and his claim of pretext, but he 
failed to do so.4 
Therefore, Mr. Hausknecht's third argument failed to 
warrant a hearing in this case as ordered by the Administrative Law 
Judge• 
Mr. Hausknecht's fourth argument was that a hearing is 
necessary to facilitate the development of evidence related to his 
allegation that Kennecott terminated his employment to avoid having 
to pay him severance benefits. Request at 4. This argument fails 
because: (1) the purpose of a hearing is not to produce new 
evidence, see discussion above at 2; (2) the information contained 
in the disclosures made by Kennecott to the investigator 
demonstrated precisely the basis upon which Kennecott terminated 
the employment of Mr. Hausknecht; and (3) Mr. Hausknecht had ample 
opportunity to submit evidence to support his claim relevant to 
this issue at the investigation stage, but he failed to do so. The 
reality is that no evidence was presented by the charging party 
See footnote 2, supra. 
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that his termination was motivated by Kennecotts desire to reduce 
staff and to save severance benefits. In fact, this issue did not 
appear as part of the charge but was merely an argument raised by 
the charging party in his July 22, 1992, reply statement at page 1. 
Indeed the extent of the "evidence" offered was nothing more than 
a bald suggestion of Kennecott's motivation. The facts in the case 
completely refuted the suggestion and the charging party did not 
substantiate the claim in any way. 
Mr. Hausknecht's fifth argument was that a hearing is 
necessary to produce evidence related to Kennecott's sexual 
harassment policy and his knowledge of it. Request at 4. Like the 
other arguments, this argument could not form the basis of the 
Order because: (1) the purpose of a hearing is not to produce new 
evidence, see discussion above at 2; (2) it is irrelevant whether 
Mr. Hausknecht was actually guilty of sexual harassment,5 see 
discussion above at n. 3; (3) evidence related to this issue, 
including a copy of the policy, was submitted during the 
investigation, see Kennecott's June 10, 1992, Response; and (4) Mr. 
Hausknecht had ample opportunity to submit evidence related to this 
issue at the investigation stage, but he failed to do so. 
Mr. Hausknecht's sixth and final argument was that a 
5
 It is simply incredible that in the face of his admissions that he was guilty of 
hugging and kissing Kennecott's female employees and that in connection with his 
employment he attempted to extract a kiss as payment for doing his job, Mr. Hausknecht 
would now urge the Commission to hold a hearing to gather "crucial evidentiary testimony-" 
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hearing is needed to investigate and take evidence and testimony 
related to one of the alleged bases (sexual harassment) for the 
termination of his employment. Request at 5. This argument fails 
because: (1) the purpose of a hearing is not to investigate and 
produce new evidence, see discussion above at 2; (2) it is 
irrelevant whether Mr. Hausknecht was actually guilty of sexual 
harassment, see discussion above at n. 3; (3) extensive and 
detailed evidence related to the issue of Mr. Hausknecht's sexual 
naughtiness, including 58 pages of notes from Kennecott's inves-
tigation, were submitted at the investigation stage, see Kenne-
cott's June 10, 1992, Response; and (4) Mr. Hausknecht had ample 
opportunity to submit evidence related to this issue at the 
investigation stage, but he did not do so.6 
In sum, none of Mr. Hausknecht's arguments provided any 
basis whatsoever for the Administrative Law Judge to set this case 
for a hearing. The Request for a hearing should have been denied. 
It is not sufficient for an Administrative Law Judge merely to 
recite the law and to find merely that the law has been met when 
specific bases for the formal adjudication have been asserted by 
the charging party and those bases have each been completely 
rebutted by the Responding Party. 
6
 One wonders whether at such a hearing Mr. Hausknecht would attempt now to 
deny that he engaged in his objectionable behavior or whether more evidence of 
unacceptable behavior would surface. 
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RELIEF REQUESTED 
The Commission should issue its order vacating the 
Administrative Law Judge/s Order Granting Formal Hearing Upon 
Further Review and denying a formal hearing on the charge* 
DATED this 12 — day of May, 1993. 
M. ELEGANT] 1ES E
of and for 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Kennecott Corporation 
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